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ABSTRACT 
  Debates about statutory interpretation—and especially about the 
role of the canons of construction and legislative history—are 
generally framed in one-size-fits-all terms. Yet federal judges—
including most Supreme Court Justices—have not approached 
statutory interpretation from a methodologically uniform perspective. 
This Article presents the first in-depth examination of interpretive 
approaches taken in two distinct subject areas over an extended 
period of time. Professors Brudney and Ditslear compare how the 
Supreme Court has relied on legislative history and the canons of 
construction when construing tax statutes and workplace statutes from 
1969 to 2008. 
  The authors conclude that the Justices tend to rely on legislative 
history for importantly different reasons in these two fields. The Court 
regularly invokes committee reports and floor statements in the 
workplace law area for the traditional role of identifying and 
elaborating on the legislative bargain that Congress reached. By 
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contrast, the Justices often rely on the legislative history 
accompanying tax statutes to borrow expertise from key committee 
actors. The Court’s use of tax legislative history for expertise-
borrowing purposes relates to the distinctive nature of how tax 
legislative history is produced, featuring regular cross-party and 
interbranch cooperation that is virtually unimaginable in the 
workplace law setting. Although most Justices have appreciated the 
special character of tax legislative history, Justice Scalia remains 
steadfast in his unwillingness to do so. 
  With respect to the use of canons, Brudney and Ditslear find that 
the Court makes comparatively heavier use of the whole act rule and 
related structural canons in its tax majorities. The authors suggest that 
the Justices may recognize the Internal Revenue Code to be more of a 
coherent and self-contained regulatory scheme than the series of 
workplace law statutes scattered across multiple titles of the U.S. 
Code. As for substantive canons, the Justices are much more likely to 
invoke tax-based judicial policy norms than to rely on canons 
grounded in the specifics of workplace law. The authors contend that 
the Court’s use of these tax law canons should be viewed as a 
derivative form of expertise borrowing. 
  Finally, Brudney and Ditslear explore the special role played by 
Justice Blackmun in the tax area. They demonstrate how Blackmun’s 
expertise in tax law and his attentiveness to its legislative history 
anchored the Court’s performance for twenty-four years. Since 
Blackmun’s retirement, the other Justices have been less interested in 
reviewing tax cases and far less willing to use legislative history when 
they choose to decide such cases. 
  The evidence that familiar interpretive resources play distinctive 
roles in the area of tax law contributes to a subtler and richer texture 
for statutory interpretation than is often captured in scholarly debates. 
At the same time, the authors’ results also indicate that the Court since 
the late 1980s has exhibited greater uniformity in its reasoning in tax 
law and workplace law cases. Brudney and Ditslear wonder whether 
the philosophical arguments favoring a more inflexible approach to 
statutory interpretation are beginning to trump a pragmatic 
orientation that is more sensitive to differences among particular 
subject matter areas of federal law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Among judges and legal scholars, debates about statutory 
interpretation—and especially about the role of the canons of 
construction and legislative history—are generally framed in one-size-
fits-all terms. The canons receive praise as interpretive rules that limit 
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judicial discretion and render statutory meaning more predictable;1 
they draw criticism for being readily manipulable and for frustrating 
the policy preferences of Congress.2 Similarly, legislative history has 
both advocates and detractors: critics contend that judges should 
ignore such record materials because they are incoherent, unreliable, 
and politicized,3 whereas supporters identify the probative and 
democratic virtues of legislative materials in comparably systemic 
language.4 
These debates can be productive and illuminating, but they tend 
to obscure the fact that federal judges—including most Supreme 
Court Justices—do not approach statutory interpretation from 
methodologically uniform perspectives.5 One important factor that 
Justices may recognize and incorporate, even if implicitly, is the 
diverse subject matter of the laws that come before them.6 Congress 
follows the same basic lawmaking process when enacting and 
updating regulatory schemes—whether they address criminal law, 
antitrust, labor relations, civil rights, or tax law. Yet salient 
 
 1. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 25–29 (1997); CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 147–
57 (1990); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 921, 943–45 (1992). 
 2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 276–83 
(1985); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn its 
Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 562, 572 (1992); Edward L. Rubin, Modern 
Statutes, Loose Canons and the Limits of Practical Reason: A Response to Farber and Ross, 45 
VAND. L. REV. 579, 590 (1992). 
 3. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 1, at 31–37; ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 89–115 (2006); Alex 
Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 807, 812–14 (1998); Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 447 (1990). 
 4. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 304, 310–17 (2d ed. 2006); KENT 
GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 173–75 (1999); 
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 
845, 847 (1992); Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of 
Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 437–42 (2005); Charles Tiefer, 
The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 
230–32. 
 5. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008) (arguing that judges 
use a pragmatic approach to decide cases); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES 
JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (providing a strategic account of Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
 6. Other factors influencing judicial reasoning approaches include individual biography 
and institutional dynamics. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 50–
154 (2006); EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 56–181; POSNER, supra note 5, at 125–73. 
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differences in semantic formulation and political dynamics help shape 
these enactments, and such differences can influence judicial efforts 
to understand what Congress has wrought. Relatedly, federal statutes 
reflect policy preferences that are straightforwardly ideological in 
certain subject areas, whereas in others the policy choices are 
couched in technically intricate and even obscure terms. 
In this Article, we examine how the Supreme Court’s uses of 
legislative history and the canons of construction vary based on the 
subject matter of laws enacted by Congress. We do so by comparing 
the Court’s interpretive approach to a highly specialized and 
relatively collaborative area of lawmaking—the Internal Revenue 
Code—with the Court’s methods of interpretation in the field of 
workplace law, which is among the most ideologically divisive and 
partisan areas of congressional activity. Our comparative assessment 
relies on two Supreme Court datasets we have compiled over a period 
of years: nearly 160 decisions construing the Internal Revenue Code 
from 1969–2008, and roughly 600 cases applying federal workplace 
statutes over the same thirty-nine year period.7 Our general 
hypothesis is that the Court’s patterns of reasoning in the often-
arcane tax law field will differ in meaningful respects from its use of 
key interpretive resources when construing civil rights and labor 
relations texts that are generated through a more traditionally 
politicized legislative process. 
Our findings support this hypothesis, often in striking ways. 
Initially, we determine that the Court is significantly8 more likely to 
rely on legislative history to help justify tax law decisions than it is to 
help explain workplace law outcomes. This difference arises in the 
Burger Court years (1969–86) and the Rehnquist and Roberts Court 
period (1986–2008);9 it has persisted until quite recently even as the 
Court’s legislative history reliance declines over time in both subject 
matter areas. In addition, we find that the Court relies significantly 
more often on language canons in tax law than in workplace law, 
 
 7. For a discussion of how we assembled these datasets, see infra Part I.B. 
 8. For an explanation of statistical significance in this context, see infra note 82. 
 9. The Roberts Court has only three terms of decisions through June 2008 (including five 
cases construing the tax code and twenty-five cases applying workplace law statutes). This Court 
also includes seven of the nine Rehnquist Court Justices, including Justices Scalia, Breyer, and 
Stevens, whose views on statutory interpretation methods have been expressed and applied over 
an extended period. Accordingly, we have grouped the first three years of the Roberts Court 
with the Rehnquist Court for purposes of empirical analysis. 
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whereas the Court’s use of substantive canons is comparable between 
the two statutory areas.10 
Probing further, we conclude that the Justices tend to rely on 
legislative history for importantly different reasons in these two fields. 
The Court regularly invokes committee reports and floor statements 
in the workplace law area for the traditional role of identifying and 
elaborating on the legislative bargain that Congress reached. By 
contrast, the Justices often rely on the legislative history 
accompanying tax statutes to borrow expertise from key committee 
actors. We identify this difference in function by assessing the 
variation in types of legislative history relied on in each subject 
matter area, comparing the Justices’ propensity to disagree about the 
meaning of legislative history in their nonunanimous decisions, and 
discussing illustrative majority opinions from the tax field. 
The Court’s use of tax legislative history for expertise-borrowing 
purposes is due in no small measure to the complex, specialized, and 
often opaque substantive concepts in dispute. But this expertise 
borrowing also relates to the unusual nature of how tax legislative 
history is produced, featuring regular cross-party and interbranch 
cooperation that is virtually unimaginable in the workplace law 
setting. Most Justices seem to appreciate the distinctive character of 
tax legislative history, in which the Joint Committee on Taxation 
(JCT) plays a central role. Justice Scalia, however, is unwilling to do 
so, as exemplified by one of his earliest opinions, which was critical of 
legislative history produced in the tax setting.11 
We also find some intriguing differences between the Court’s use 
of the canons in tax cases and workplace decisions. With respect to 
language canons, the Court makes comparatively heavier use of the 
whole act rule and related structural canons in its tax majorities. We 
suggest that the Justices may recognize the Internal Revenue Code to 
be more of a coherent and self-contained regulatory scheme than the 
series of workplace law statutes scattered across multiple titles of the 
U.S. Code. As for substantive canons, the Justices are much more 
likely to invoke tax-based judicial policy norms than to rely on canons 
grounded in the specifics of workplace law. We contend that the 
 
 10. For an explanation of the difference between language canons and substantive canons, 
see infra Part I.A.1.  
 11. See Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7–8 (D.C. Cir. 1985); infra Part III.A.4 (discussing 
Hirshey). 
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Court’s use of these tax law canons may be sensibly viewed as a 
subsidiary form of expertise borrowing. 
In addition, we note one other difference in the Court’s 
comparative approach to tax law decisions—the disproportionate role 
played by Justice Blackmun. During his twenty-four terms on the 
Court, Blackmun, a former tax law practitioner, authored 30 percent 
of the Court’s majorities construing the Internal Revenue Code. 
Because this is almost double the frequency of authorship for any 
other Justice in the field of workplace law, we examine Justice 
Blackmun’s interpretive approach in the tax law area. We find that 
his use of legislative history is high—close to 60 percent of his tax 
majorities—although legislative history reliance by Blackmun’s 
colleagues during his tenure on the Court is even higher at 67 percent, 
including 64 percent during the first eight terms of the Rehnquist 
period.12 
After Justice Blackmun’s retirement in 1994, however, the 
Court’s legislative history reliance in tax decisions declined 
significantly to 34 percent. In addition, the Court’s appetite for 
deciding tax cases has diminished noticeably since 1994. Without the 
anchoring presence of Blackmun’s expertise in tax law, the Justices 
seem both less interested in reviewing tax cases and less comfortable 
making use of legislative history when they choose to decide such 
cases. Justice Blackmun’s reluctance to invoke tax-specific 
substantive canons also distinguishes him from his colleagues; this 
reluctance may well reflect Blackmun’s confidence in his ability to 
reason through particular disputes over the meaning of tax law. 
Our Article represents the first in-depth effort to compare the 
Court’s interpretive approach in two distinct subject areas over an 
extended period of time.13 We view this comparative treatment as 
important because it demonstrates how the Justices apply key 
interpretive resources such as legislative history and the canons in 
ways that are more complex and nuanced than previously understood. 
 
 12. For our findings on Blackmun majorities and the Court’s use of legislative history in tax 
cases before and after Blackmun’s retirement, see infra Part II.D. 
 13. We are aware of one prior study that addressed legislative history use in an earlier era. 
See Beth M. Henschen, Judicial Use of Legislative History and Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 
10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 353, 360–61 (1985) (comparing Supreme Court reasoning in antitrust and 
labor law from 1950 to 1972); see also Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes: Interpretive Regimes, 
38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1909, 1966–69 (2005) (presenting brief comparisons between Justices’ 
rationales in civil rights and business cases, drawing on the Brudney and Ditslear database and 
analyses for the civil rights portion). 
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This complexity in turn points to the incomplete nature of recent 
debates about the admissibility vel non of legislative history and the 
canons’ possible success as impartial or predictive interpretive assets. 
By exploring the diverse functions and values ascribed to these 
resources in different subject matter settings, we also hope to 
encourage further research from scholars engaged in the empirical 
analysis of judicial reasoning.14 
Part I introduces the canons and legislative history as 
interpretive resources, and summarizes generic disagreements over 
their value. Part I also describes our two parallel datasets in 
workplace law and tax law. Part II presents our comparative findings, 
focused on the Court’s uses of legislative history and the canons as 
well as the variations in majority authorship by subject area among 
individual Justices. Part III pursues key aspects of our findings from 
doctrinal and behavioral standpoints. 
I.  THE CANONS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND OUR DATASETS 
A. Tensions between the Canons and Legislative History 
Although it is ultimately the federal courts’ role to resolve 
disputes about the meaning of statutory text, each of the three 
branches of government contributes important contextual resources 
on which courts regularly rely when performing their interpretive 
function. Beginning in the 1980s, considerable tension has arisen 
between supporters of the canons of construction, a judicially created 
interpretive asset, and defenders of legislative history, an interpretive 
resource generated by Congress. Because this tension informs much 
of the descriptive and normative debate about statutory 
interpretation, we provide a brief overview here.15 
 
 14. For a discussion of this emerging research area, see generally Frank B. Cross, The 
Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971 (2007); 
Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
LAW AND POLITICS 360, 373–74 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen & Gregory A. 
Caldeira eds., 2008); Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial 
Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REV. 63 (2008); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the 
Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decisionmaking, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873 
(2008) (book review). 
 15. There is also lively debate among scholars and judges about the executive branch’s 
distinctive interpretive asset—agency guidance in the form of rules and adjudications. See, e.g., 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 
1097–196 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 
833, 852–89 (2001); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 
BRUDNEY IN FINAL2.DOC 5/5/2009  4:02:09 PM 
2009] STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1239 
1. Canons of Construction and Legalistic Interpretation.  The 
canons of construction are background presumptions that judges have 
invoked for centuries as interpretive aids.16 These presumptions are 
useful because understanding congressional text inevitably requires 
relying on certain principles about “how words should ordinarily be 
understood [and about] how regulatory statutes should interact with 
constitutional structure and substantive policy.”17 Although canons of 
construction can be classified in numerous ways, we follow the 
prevailing taxonomy that identifies language canons and substantive 
canons as the two basic categories.18 
Language canons relied on by the Supreme Court include 
linguistic inferences stemming from Congress’s use of certain words 
instead of others,19 grammar and syntax guidelines predicated on the 
configuration of words in a given sentence,20 and principles of textual 
cohesion arising from the presumed relationship between particular 
words and language found in other parts of the same statute or in 
similar statutes.21 These language canons are avowedly content 
neutral: they purport to give effect to the “ordinary” or “common” 
meaning of statutory text based on what a rational Congress must 
have meant when it chose to enact the words in question.22 
 
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 827–47, 865–71 (2006); United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–38 (2001); id. at 239–56 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Smiley v. 
Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739–46 (1996). We plan to discuss how our datasets 
contribute to that debate in a subsequent article. 
 16. See Bradford C. Mank, Textualism’s Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: 
Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 
86 KY. L.J. 527, 542–43 (1998) (discussing the use of canons in sixteenth century English case 
law); see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. 
REV. 1179, 1183–91 (describing the use of canons to construe ancient Hindu texts and Biblical 
commentary as well as Roman Law). 
 17. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 150; see also REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION 
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 228 (1975) (suggesting that many canons “reflect the 
probabilities generated by normal usage or legislative behavior”). 
 18. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest 
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12–14 (2005). 
 19. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY app. B 
at 19–21 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing, inter alia, the canons of noscitur a sociis, expressio unius, and 
ordinary usage). 
 20. See id. app. B at 21 (discussing, inter alia, the punctuation rule, the may-shall rule, and 
the rule of the last antecedent). 
 21. See id. app. B at 21–23 (discussing, inter alia, the whole act rule, the presumption 
against redundancy, the presumption of statutory consistency with respect to the same or similar 
terms, and the presumption that provisos and exceptions are to be read narrowly). 
 22. See Ross, supra note 2, at 563; Shapiro, supra note 1, at 927. 
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By contrast, substantive canons reflect a wide array of judicially 
based policy concerns. They are grounded not in semantic verities but 
rather in the courts’ understanding of how to harmonize statutory text 
with judicially identified constitutional priorities,23 judicially perceived 
statutory objectives,24 or preenactment common law practices.25 Most 
of the statute-based substantive canons are couched in broadly 
applicable terms,26 but some relate to specific subject areas including a 
number of tax law-related substantive canons.27 
Ample support is expressed for both sets of canons based on the 
common-sense guidance they offer. As rules of thumb addressing how 
certain words or phrases often interrelate, or how Congress’s 
authority might be reconciled with that of the president, a state 
legislature, or an international treaty, the canons “help uncover 
competing interpretive possibilities.”28 Moreover, when judges 
approach these rules of thumb as presumptive rather than conclusive, 
they can question or distinguish the rules in light of other interpretive 
factors.29 By effectively encouraging courts to consider additional 
sources of legislative meaning, the canons promote a more reflective 
judicial conversation that helps provide structure and coherence for 
majority opinions. At the same time, there is a risk when canons are 
defended not simply as deepening the interpretive inquiry but also—
 
 23. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, app. B at 29–34 (discussing, inter alia, the 
presumption against federal preemption of traditional state regulation, the rule of lenity, the 
presumption against interpretations that would jeopardize a statute’s constitutionality, and the 
presumption favoring concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction over federal claims). 
 24. See id. app. B at 36–41 (discussing, inter alia, the presumption against repeals by 
implication, the strict construction of statutes authorizing appeals, and the presumption that 
each side bears its own costs in adjudications). 
 25. See id. app. B at 34–35 (discussing, inter alia, the rule against extraterritorial application 
of U.S. law, the rule against implied waivers of U.S. sovereign immunity, and the presumption 
favoring common law usage when Congress employs “words or concepts with well-settled 
common law traditions”). 
 26. See id. app. B at 36–38 (listing examples of canons that apply generally across subject 
areas). 
 27. See id. app. B at 41 (discussing, inter alia, the presumption that IRS tax assessments are 
correct, the presumption against a taxpayer claiming income tax deduction, and the 
presumption that tax exemptions should be narrowly construed). 
 28. R.N. Graham, In Defense of Maxims, 22 STATUTE L. REV. 45, 68 (2001). 
 29. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996) (using a language canon to 
raise a question about congressional intent); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 261–
62 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing for using a substantive canon as a presumption that 
triggers consideration of legislative history and other “conventional techniques” of 
interpretation). 
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less accurately—as enhancing the predictability and impartiality of 
enacted law. 
The contention that canons are an objective ordering 
mechanism, a set of “off the rack[] gap-filling” principles,30 has been 
criticized on descriptive and normative grounds, by us as well as 
others.31 The language canons’ asserted predictive value is 
undermined by the fact that members of Congress and their staffs 
evidently do not consider these canons central to their lawmaking 
enterprise. Instead, they view drafting as a highly contextual and 
intensely pressured process that involves a shifting coalition of invited 
and uninvited players, a process into which generalized rules of 
construction are not readily incorporated.32 Further, the language 
canons tend to provoke principled disparate applications—this is true 
whether they address the structural integrity of the statute as a whole 
or the semantic consistency of its discrete parts.33 Substantive canons 
often lack predictive value for a related but distinct reason—judges 
assign them varying weights in different case-specific circumstances. 
These canons may function as virtually irrebuttable clear statement 
rules or as mere tiebreakers, but most often they operate as 
presumptions that can be overcome by the persuasive force of other 
 
 30. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66–67 (1994) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Shapiro, supra note 1, at 943 (“[T]wo interrelated values that are served are 
predictability and fair notice.”). 
 31. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 276–83; Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18, at 103; Ross, 
supra note 2, at 562. 
 32. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A 
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 590–604 (2002) (describing the drafting 
process as perceived by key staff members); see also James J. Brudney, Congressional 
Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 16–17, 21–26 (1994) (discussing the fractured and politically sensitive nature of the 
congressional lawmaking process). 
 33. For examples of conflict about the proper application of the whole act rule, see 
Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 354–55 (1988); id. at 360 (White, J., dissenting); 
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 351 (1981); id. at 371 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 
Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 640 & n.45, 641 (1980); id. 
at 709 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For examples of conflict about the proper application of 
expressio unius, see Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168–69 (2003); id. at 180–81 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 582–84 (2000); id. at 593–94 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). For broader empirical evidence, see Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18, 
at 65, 68, 96. We found that majority reliance on language canons is associated with a significant 
increase in dissent dependence on language canons as well and that a comparable association 
exists between majority and dissent reliance on substantive canons, id. at 68, and we inferred 
that in divided decisions the Justices are likely to view the canons as reasonably amenable to 
supporting either side, id. at 96. 
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interpretive resources.34 Taken together, these uncertainties let judges 
exercise considerable discretion when applying both kinds of canons. 
As for the canons’ putative impartiality, our prior research on 
workplace law decisions indicates that canon reliance by liberal 
Justices is associated with liberal outcomes whereas canon usage by 
conservative Justices is linked to conservative results.35 Given the 
absence of a constraining effect on judicial policy preferences, the 
canons may well function as a form of justification for outcomes that 
are favored for other reasons, rather than serving as overarching 
neutral principles. 
Moreover, for the subset of Supreme Court workplace law 
decisions in which the majority invokes the canons but ignores 
legislative history while the dissent relies on legislative history, the 
results have been not content neutral but overwhelmingly 
conservative.36 Our doctrinal analysis of these cases indicates that 
since the late 1980s, the Court’s conservative majority has used the 
canons in such contested cases to frustrate the demonstrable policy 
preferences of Congress.37 Tension between canons and legislative 
history has thus taken on a distinctly ideological texture at least in the 
area of workplace law. 
2. Legislative History and Purposive Interpretation.  The term 
“legislative history” in a federal setting refers primarily to the 
materials generated by Congress that manifest a bill’s journey toward 
enactment, including any explanations, deliberations, or tradeoffs that 
 
 34. The Court’s Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) decisions invoking 
the general antipreemption presumption convey the variable probative impact of a given 
substantive canon. Over an extended period, the Court has relied on the presumption in 
numerous cases to help justify restricting the scope of ERISA, whereas the Court has 
distinguished or ignored the presumption in a comparable number of other cases imposing 
ERISA preemption. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18, at 106 nn.438–39 (citing six 
illustrative decisions). For an example of divergent understandings regarding both the weight 
attributable to the presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction and how consistently the 
Court has applied this canon in prior years, compare Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248–49, 
with id. at 260–66 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 35. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18, at 57–60. 
 36. See id. at 68, 77–93. 
 37. See id. at 93–94, 108–09; see also Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of 
Statutory Interpretation, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 37, 38–51 (1991) (arguing that the Court’s reliance 
on civil rights statutes’ “plain meaning” in the 1970s and 1980s invariably led the Court to 
construe the statutes at issue more narrowly than Congress intended); Stephen F. Ross, 
Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 399, 421–25 (suggesting that 
conservative reliance on “plain meaning” in an era of Democratic control of Congress may 
result in conservative outcomes that do not honor Congress’s explicit intent). 
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are part of that enactment process.38 In Congress’s committee-based 
system of drafting, reviewing, and approving bills for consideration by 
the full chamber, the legislative history most frequently invoked by 
courts is standing committee reports.39 Courts also rely on other 
legislative record items, including original bill language, committee 
hearings, floor statements and related developments such as proposed 
amendments and conference reports.40 
The primary rationale for crediting legislative history as helping 
to resolve or amplify textual meaning is that statutes are more than 
disembodied textual products—they are a form of communication 
that reflects a purposive group effort.41 In seeking to construe this 
purposive communication, courts may decide that a specific piece of 
legislative history is sufficiently persuasive in context to justify 
attributing to Congress as a whole the understanding and intent 
expressed in the document.42 The principle of reasonably imputed 
institutional approval rests on the assumption that legislative intent 
can be derived from Congress’s structure and operation as a 
representative body—specifically from the formal and informal 
subgroups that Congress effectively charges with responsibility for 
 
 38. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, at 971–72. In addition to this horizontal narrative 
accompanying enactment of a particular text, legislative history also may include the vertical 
record of how the text under review has evolved or been modified from versions enacted by 
prior Congresses. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 572–74 (1982) 
(discussing four earlier versions of a statute penalizing employers for nonpayment of seamen’s 
wages); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 614–17 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (discussing multiple earlier versions of a statutory provision listing types of 
organizations entitled to tax-exempt status under Internal Revenue Code). 
 39. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, at 981 (“Most judges and scholars agree that 
committee reports should be considered as authoritative legislative history and should be given 
great weight . . . .”). 
 40. See id. at 971–72, 1000, 1020–22; GREENAWALT, supra note 4, at 171. 
 41. See Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from Positive 
Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957, 967–81 (2007) 
(discussing various types of communication, especially within the majority party, that occur at 
the early stages of legislative process); James J. Brudney, Intentionalism’s Revival, 44 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1001, 1004–08 (2007) (contending that “group intent” is attributable to 
Congress); Solan, supra note 4, at 437–49 (presenting a general theory for treating social groups 
as entities, and arguing specifically that Congress should be viewed as an entity with intent). 
 42. See Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276–77 (1996) 
(Stevens, J., concurring); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 87–88 (2005); Solan, supra note 4, at 444–49; Tiefer, supra note 4, 
at 230–32. 
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drafting textual provisions and explaining or elaborating on their 
meaning.43 
A chorus of legislative history critics have characterized this 
interpretive resource as deeply flawed. Some argue that courts should 
ignore legislative history for constitutional reasons: it is neither voted 
on by Congress nor presented to the president, and the views of 
legislative subgroups ought not be elevated over the text approved by 
Congress as a whole.44 Critics also contend that legislative history 
should be dismissed as conceptually incoherent because the 
legislature’s intention or purpose is at best deeply muddled and at 
worst unknowable.45 
Legislative history supporters have responded to these 
comprehensive critiques in comparably systemic terms. At the 
constitutional level, they maintain that rather than viewing legislative 
history as “law” or as equivalent to text, courts consult this history to 
help attribute meaning to text, just as they do the dictionary, common 
law precedent, or the canons, which also are not enacted or approved 
by Congress.46 And supporters defend the integrity of a group 
legislative purpose by applying lessons from political science,47 
analytic philosophy,48 and developmental psychology,49 as well as 
more traditional arguments from democratic theory.50 
An additional all-encompassing criticism of legislative history is 
that it lacks neutrality as an interpretive resource. Unlike the canons 
 
 43. See Bank One Chi., 516 U.S. at 276–77 (Stevens, J., concurring); George A. Costello, 
Average Voting Members and Other “Benign Fictions”: The Relative Reliability of Committee 
Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 60–73; 
Brudney, supra note 41, at 1007; Tiefer, supra note 4, at 230–32. 
 44. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza–Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452–53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Kozinski, supra note 3, at 813. 
 45. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 1, at 31–34; Kozinski, supra note 3, at 812–14; John F. 
Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 99, 102–03 
(2006). 
 46. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 4, at 862–64; Brudney, supra note 32, at 42–45; William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 372–75 (1990). 
 47. See Tiefer, supra note 4, at 268 (invoking political science research on the institutional 
role of committees as producing and supplying superior information to enhance the chamber’s 
performance). 
 48. See Solan, supra note 4, at 437–42 (discussing models of group intent as described by 
philosophers Margaret Gilbert and Michael Bratman); Tiefer, supra note 4, at 255–64 
(examining the philosophical approaches of John Austin, H.L.A. Hart, and John Searle). 
 49. See Solan, supra note 4, at 449–53 (arguing that psychological research shows that it is 
common and coherent to understand plural subjects, such as Congress, as having intent). 
 50. See BREYER, supra note 42, at 15–16, 85–101. 
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or judicial precedent, committee and floor statements are produced 
by partisans—individuals with a policy stake in the lawmaking contest 
to which they are contributing. Disagreement about the implications 
of these statements inevitably becomes politically charged, especially 
because legislators and their staffs may craft the statements with an 
eye toward manipulating or misleading judges as to the meaning of 
text.51 
Defenders of legislative history accept the political label but 
contend that this is an important dimension of its probative value. 
They observe that major legislative proposals are usually altered and 
occasionally recast by sponsoring committees or bill managers in an 
effort to accommodate concerns of wavering colleagues or to co-opt 
segments of the opposition. These substantial postintroduction 
changes in text are routinely accompanied by committee or floor 
commentaries. Accordingly, courts should appreciate that legislative 
bargains are an established feature of congressional lawmaking and 
that legislative history may illuminate a bargain’s existence or help 
explain some of its details.52 
In sum, the canons are promoted for helping to clarify 
inconclusive text in relatively nonpolitical terms; legislative history is 
praised for helping to understand the collective political will that 
accounts for the text’s successful passage. An implicit premise is that 
the virtues of each interpretive resource transcend particular subject 
matter areas addressed by Congress—that the canons and legislative 
history function in the same ways whether the regulatory scheme at 
issue involves criminal law or environmental law, banking law or 
military law, employment discrimination or income taxation. 
3. Expertise Borrowing as a Distinct Perspective.  Public choice 
accounts of language canon usage suggest a potential limitation on 
this premise of uniform applicability. Professors Macey and Miller 
assert that judges rely on language canons more often in statutory 
 
 51. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 637–38 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 
(1994). 
 52. See Breyer, supra note 4, at 858–60; James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal 
Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 146–51 (2008); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative 
Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 724–27 (1992). 
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cases of technical complexity and minimal ideological interest.53 They 
contend that judges in these instances worry about their lack of 
subject matter expertise and the consequent risk of making an 
embarrassing policy-related error, and that reliance on language 
canons offers a largely nonsubstantive basis for resolving the 
disputes.54 
Moreover, tax law scholars and commentators have long 
recognized that tax bills and their accompanying legislative history 
are generated in a unique fashion within Congress.55 At the 
predrafting stage, during the drafting of text, and in the development 
of committee reports, the legislative process encourages production 
of and reliance on expertise through bipartisan cooperation and 
 
 53. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction 
and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 659–65 (1992); cf. Frederick Schauer, Statutory 
Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 247 
(suggesting that Justices use canons when they find the cases boring in policy terms). 
 54. See Macey & Miller, supra note 53, at 662–64, 668–70. 
 55. See Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning, the Tax Code, and Doctrinal Incoherence, 48 
HASTINGS L.J. 771, 786 & n.73, 818–19 (1997) (arguing that tax law is unique because of the 
complexity and ever-changing nature of the tax code and because the process surrounding its 
creation is relatively insulated from the influence of special interest groups); Beverly I. Moran & 
Daniel M. Schneider, The Elephant and the Four Blind Men: The Burger Court and Its Federal 
Tax Decisions, 39 HOW. L.J. 841, 891–95, 903–07 (1996) (outlining reasons why legislative 
history is particularly relevant to interpreting tax law and observing that the Burger Court 
heavily relied on legislative history in this area). The discussion in this Section and Part III.A.2 
relies on observations and analyses from political science as well as law, reflecting perceptions 
of the tax legislation process from the 1950s to 2008. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, About the 
Joint Committee on Taxation 5–8, 16, http://www.house.gov/jct/About_Joint_Committee_ 
On_Taxation.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2009); Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the 
Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 832–42 
(1991) (stating that Professor Livingston served as legislative attorney for the Joint Committee 
on Taxation from 1983–87); Bradford L. Ferguson, Frederic W. Hickman & Donald C. Lubick, 
Reexamining the Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing Realities of 
the Process, 67 TAXES 804, 809–12 (1989) (noting that the three authors, in private practice as of 
1989, had direct and extensive experience in the tax legislative process between 1961 and 1980—
Lubick as Tax Legislation Counsel of the Treasury Department (1961–64) and Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy (1977–81); Hickman as Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury for Tax Policy (1972–75); and Ferguson as Tax Legislative Assistant to a Senate 
Finance Committee member (1975–77), Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury for Tax Policy (1977–79), and Associate Tax Legislation Counsel of the Treasury 
Department (1979–80)); John F. Manley, Congressional Staff and Public Policy-Making: The 
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 30 J. POL. 1046, 1048–65 (1968) (highlighting 
that Manley, a political scientist, interviewed twenty-three members of the House Ways and 
Means Committee, eight members of the Senate Finance Committee, five members of the 
congressional staff, and three high-ranking Treasury Department officials); Lawrence N. 
Woodworth, Procedures Followed by Congress in Enacting Tax Legislation and the Role of the 
Joint Committee Staff in that Process, 18 INST. ON FED. TAX’N 21, 23–32 (1966). Woodworth was 
an economist on the JCT from 1944–64 and Chief of Staff for the JCT from 1964–77.  
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interbranch dialogue. The lynchpin for this distinctively objective and 
collaborative effort is the Joint Committee on Taxation. The JCT 
includes five members from the Senate Finance Committee and five 
from the House Ways and Means Committee.56 Supported by a 
nonpartisan staff of economists, lawyers, and other tax professionals, 
the JCT oversees the preparation of standing committee reports. As 
Part III of this Article explains,57 tax committee report commentaries 
help legislators make sense of the highly technical and often obscure 
Internal Revenue Code language.58 
This concept of expertise borrowing is worth bearing in mind as 
we consider whether the Court’s pattern of reasoning is somehow 
distinctive in federal tax decisions. With respect to language canon 
usage, however, Professors Macey and Miller offer a theoretical 
explanation, not an empirical assessment of the way the Court 
actually performs when construing statutes in a technically complex 
area.59 Further, in addressing the potential role of language canons, 
Macey and Miller focus on error avoidance rather than expertise 
borrowing.60 Although the avowedly content-neutral approach of 
language canons may at times help to reduce the risk of error, a 
court’s reliance on interpretive assets to borrow subject matter 
expertise is more likely to occur with respect to substantive canons 
and legislative history, which are openly policy based and content 
driven. 
At the same time, the possibility that the Court relies on 
legislative history in its tax decisions to borrow expertise is just that—
a possibility. We noted how judges and scholars who defend 
legislative history typically point to its value as a resource identifying 
and describing the negotiated bargains that are an essential element 
 
 56. Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 55, at 2. 
 57. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 58. See Ferguson et al., supra note 55, at 810; Livingston, supra note 55, at 836. 
 59. See Macey & Miller, supra note 53, at 652–55, 667–71 (illustrating their argument with a 
single Court decision, Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers International Ass’n Local Union No. 6, 
493 U.S. 67 (1989)). 
 60. See id. at 662–64. Language canon reliance tends to promote error avoidance by 
invoking a content-neutral rule or presumption that enables the Court not to engage the 
substantive issues. By contrast, if the Court borrows expertise from an interpretive resource 
such as Supreme Court precedent or legislative history, it is engaging the substantive subject 
matter at stake. But some language canons, such as the whole code rule in tax cases, can 
arguably be viewed as a form of second-order expertise borrowing. See text accompanying notes 
276–80. 
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of congressional lawmaking.61 Our prior empirical findings supporting 
this justification were based on the Court’s use of legislative history in 
its workplace law decisions.62 In short, the prospect that the Justices 
may invoke interpretive resources for distinctive reasons in the tax 
and workplace law areas warrants detailed examination with 
reference to both legislative history and the canons. Before 
proceeding to that examination, we describe our two parallel datasets 
of Supreme Court decisions. 
B. Supreme Court Workplace Law and Tax Law Decisions 
1. Workplace Statutes.  Our workplace law dataset consists of 
every Supreme Court merits decision from the fall of 1969 to the 
spring of 2008 that construes one or more federal laws addressing an 
aspect of the employment relationship.63 This universe features 597 
decisions applying a range of congressional enactments.64 The largest 
volume of cases involves union-management relations laws and race 
or gender discrimination statutes, but there also are a considerable 
number of decisions addressed to minimum wage and overtime 
standards, safety and health, retirement benefits, discrimination based 
on age or disability, and miscellaneous employment-related disputes 
 
 61. See sources cited supra note 52; see also Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The 
Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1420–23 (2003); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 
32, at 607. 
 62. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 146–51; James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, 
The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger 
and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 227–28 (2006). 
 63. We have analyzed different aspects of this dataset—jointly and individually—in a 
number of prior articles. See, e.g., Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52 passim; James J. Brudney, 
Below the Surface: Comparing Legislative History Usage by the House of Lords and the Supreme 
Court, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 passim (2007); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 62 passim; 
Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18 passim. For a detailed discussion of how we assembled the 
dataset, see Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18, at 15–29. The complete dataset and codebook 
for workplace decisions and tax decisions addressed in this Article are available on the web. 
James Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices, http://www.psci.unt.edu/Ditslear/LH 
data.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). 
 64. The dataset also includes eighty-one decisions presenting workplace-related issues of 
constitutional law that do not implicate any federal statute. We omit these decisions from our 
analysis because we are comparing only the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation in 
different subject matter areas. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 128 n.37 (discussing the 
ways in which legislative history of statutes differs from “constitutional history” such as 
convention proceedings, state ratification debates, and The Federalist Papers). 
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arising in connection with criminal, tax, social security, or 
immigration law.65 
To examine the rationales for each majority opinion, we identify 
ten distinct interpretive resources on which the Court relies with 
some frequency. In addition to legislative history, language canons, 
and substantive canons, these include (i) the meaning of the textual 
language and related appeals to plain or ordinary meaning, (ii) 
dictionaries, (iii) legislative purpose, (iv) legislative inaction, (v) 
Supreme Court precedent, (vi) common law precedent, and (vii) 
agency deference.66 We omit items that the Justices rely on less 
frequently, such as law review articles and treatises. 
When reviewing each opinion, we identify the interpretive 
resources being invoked and then determine whether a resource (a) is 
merely referenced, which includes being mentioned in background 
discussion or dismissed as substantively unpersuasive or (b) is relied 
on as affirmatively probative to advance the outcome endorsed by the 
majority author, which includes being invoked as “a” or “the” 
determining factor in the majority’s reasoning process.67 Almost all 
majority opinions rely on at least two of the ten listed interpretive 
resources, and the vast majority rely on three or more resources to 
help explain or justify their holdings. 
We apply the same coding distinctions used for majority opinions 
to identify the nature and extent of judicial reliance in all dissenting 
opinions that include an elaboration of reasons. In addition, we 
classify the votes by individual Justices for every decision, based on 
whether a Justice authored or joined a majority or plurality, a 
concurrence, a dissent, or some combination thereof. We are thus 
able to group the dataset based on the size of the Court majority, 
distinguishing close cases from decisions that are unanimous or nearly 
 
 65. For a fuller discussion of which statutes fall in each subject matter category, see 
Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18, at 17–18. From the 1969 through the 2007 term, 192 of the 
597 workplace law cases involved labor-management relations, 147 cases involved race or 
gender discrimination statutes, 59 cases construed provisions involving other forms of status 
discrimination (mostly age and disability), 74 cases addressed statutes setting minimum 
workplace standards, 66 cases involved retirement-related statutes, 25 cases involved general 
negligence-based provisions that apply primarily to workers in the railroad or maritime 
industries, and 48 cases addressed miscellaneous employment-related provisions. This total 
exceeds 597 because, in a number of cases, the Court construed statutes from more than one 
category. 
 66. For a fuller discussion of how we identify these ten resources, see id. at 23–24. 
 67. For a fuller discussion of the rationale for this approach to judicial reasoning, as well as 
challenges involved in distinguishing between reference and reliance, see id. at 25–26. 
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unanimous. We also can identify patterns of reliance on specific 
interpretive resources by individual Justices, including those who may 
author a disproportionate number of majority opinions in a given 
field. 
2. Tax Statutes.  Our tax law dataset consists of every Supreme 
Court merits decision from 1969 to 2008 that involves the 
interpretation of federal tax statutes. Although we compiled our 
workplace law dataset from scratch, the collection of tax law decisions 
borrows heavily from a database assembled by Professor Nancy 
Staudt and a team of legal scholars and social scientists.68 Professor 
Staudt and her colleagues searched broadly for Supreme Court 
decisions mentioning the word “tax” but they retained only decisions 
involving the interpretation of a federal tax statute, excluding all state 
taxation cases as well as constitutional disputes that did not implicate 
a federal statute.69 
Using the Staudt database, we identified 153 Supreme Court 
cases decided between October 1969 and December 2005. Adopting 
the Staudt selection criteria, we have added five cases decided by the 
Court since January 2006. We then coded these 158 cases exactly as 
we did the workplace law decisions, using the same ten interpretive 
resources for majority and dissenting opinions, the same distinction 
between referencing and relying on a resource, and the same 
classification of votes by individual Justices for each decision. 
Looking at respective contributions to the Court’s docket, we 
note that the Justices address far more federal workplace law disputes 
than federal tax controversies: they have decided nearly four times as 
many workplace law cases in our thirty-nine-year period. This gap is 
due in part to the sheer volume of major new workplace statutes, 
targeting various specific subdivisions of the private and public 
workforce and regulating a wide range of employment conditions.70 
 
 68. See Staudt et al., supra note 13, at 1926–27. We are grateful to Professor Staudt and her 
coauthors, Professors Lee Epstein, Peter Wiedenbeck, René Lindstädt, and Ryan J. Vander 
Wielen, for providing us with their list of more than three hundred Supreme Court cases 
decided between January 1950 and December 2005. One of us analyzed a limited subset of these 
decisions in a prior article. See Brudney, supra note 63, at 29–35. 
 69. See Staudt et al., supra note 13, at 1927. 
 70. Among the federal statutes frequently applied by the Court are laws classified in Title 
29 covering “Labor” (for example, the National Labor Relations Act, the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the 
Employee Income Retirement Security Act, and the Worker Adjustment Retraining 
Notification Act) but also laws codified as civil rights statutes under Title 42 (Title VII of the 
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That volume in turn reflects the enduring importance of work in 
modern American culture, and the Court’s related attentiveness to 
continuing efforts by Congress and the president to reconcile 
provision of employee rights with recognition of employer interests. 
Conversely, despite the obvious importance of tax policy, the subject 
receives less high-profile attention from Congress than does 
workplace law. Congress has passed numerous statutes since 1970, 
but it has not innovated in the tax law area the same way it has in the 
workplace law area.71 In addition, the Justices may have less interest 
in or understanding of tax law issues, a possibility we explore in Part 
III. 
The fact that congressional tax policy is set forth almost 
exclusively within a single title of the U.S. Code does not mean, 
however, that federal tax statutes are monolithic in nature. Like their 
workplace counterparts, the tax laws encompass diverse substantive 
issues, including core concepts such as defining taxable income72 and 
identifying contours and limits of various deductions73 and 
exemptions.74 The tax code also includes a range of procedural 
provisions implicating matters of jurisdiction,75 limitation periods,76 
 
1964 Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Civil War era statutes), as 
well as laws addressed to specific industries or occupations (for example, federal civil service 
laws under Title 5, the Mine Safety and Health Act under Title 30, the Longshore & Harbor 
Workers Compensation Act under Title 33, the Davis-Bacon Act regulating construction 
workers under Title 40, and the Railway Labor Act under Title 45) and a separate statute 
regulating arbitration (the Federal Arbitration Act under Title 9). 
 71. See JOSHUA D. ROSENBERG & DOMINIC L. DAHER, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 11 (2008) (noting that Congress enacted its major Internal Revenue Code revisions 
in 1939, 1954, and 1986); Nancy Staudt et al., The Ideological Component of Judging in the 
Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797, 1818 n.68 (2006) (noting that the code’s basic 
structure has been unchanged since 1954). By contrast, Congress since 1960 has created entire 
new areas of federal workplace law, regulating, inter alia, employment discrimination based on 
race, sex, age, and disability; occupational safety and health; and employee pensions. 
 72. See, e.g., O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 81 (1996); Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 
726, 728–29 (1989); Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 370, 372 (1983); Comm’r v. 
Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 82–83 (1977). 
 73. See, e.g., United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 825–26 (2001); 
United States v. Centennial Sav. Bank FSB, 499 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1991); United States v. 
Hughes Props., Inc., 476 U.S. 593, 595 (1986); Don E. Williams Co. v. Comm’r, 429 U.S. 569, 570 
(1977). 
 74. See, e.g., Knight v. Comm’r, 128 S. Ct. 782, 785 (2008); United States v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 352 (1988); United States v. Am. Coll. of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 835–36 
(1986); Paulsen v. Comm’r, 469 U.S. 131, 136–37 (1985). 
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 128 S. Ct. 1511, 1514 (2008); 
Hinck v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2011, 2013 (2007); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue 
Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 310 (2005); Comm’r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 237 (1996). 
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and agency approaches to enforcement,77 including criminal 
enforcement.78 We suggest in Part III that the Court’s distinctive uses 
of legislative history and canons in its tax law cases relate to both 
substantive and procedural decisions, although in somewhat different 
ways. 
Finally, there are thirteen decisions (two from the Burger era 
and eleven from the Rehnquist years) that appear in both the 
workplace and tax law datasets. We classify them as workplace law 
decisions because they address the employment relationship, albeit in 
ancillary form.79 They are part of our tax dataset because Professor 
Staudt and her colleagues identified them based on her criteria. We 
include them in our judicial reasoning analyses for both datasets 
because they legitimately belong in each. Given the small number of 
these cases, and their relatively representative character for our 
judicial reasoning purposes, we see no risk of distortion from this 
double counting.80 
II.  RESULTS 
A. Comparative Reliance on Legislative History and Canons over 
Time 
We begin with a broad comparison between the Court’s majority 
reasoning in its tax and workplace law decisions. Table 1 reports the 
 
 76. See, e.g., EC Term of Years Trust v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1763, 1767–68 (2007); 
United States v. Galletti, 541 U.S. 114, 116 (2004); United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 
348–49 (1997); Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 389–90 (1984). 
 77. See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 276–78 (2002); Drye v. United States, 528 
U.S. 49, 52 (1999); United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 519 (1998); United States v. 
Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 355–56 (1989). 
 78. See, e.g., Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 11–14 (1980); United States v. Bishop, 
412 U.S. 346, 347–48 (1973); Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 90 (1969). 
 79. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 324–27 (1995) (holding that the liquidated 
damages portion of an employee’s age discrimination settlement is not excludable from gross 
income for tax purposes); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 242 (1992) (holding that back 
pay awards under Title VII are not excludable from gross income); St. Martin’s Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 788 (1981) (holding that parochial schools are 
exempt from unemployment taxes under a statute’s exception for church employees). 
 80. Five of the thirteen majority opinions (38.5 percent) rely on legislative history, five rely 
on language canons, and three (23.1 percent) rely on substantive canons. Further, three of the 
six cases (50 percent) decided during Justice Blackmun’s tenure were authored by him. All of 
these figures for duplicate cases are within two standard deviations from the mean of all cases, 
which is the generally accepted line for outlier status, thus suggesting that their impact on the 
larger analyses has not been skewed. See LARRY GONICK & WOOLLCOTT SMITH, THE 
CARTOON GUIDE TO STATISTICS 18–26 (1993). 
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extent to which the Court relies on our ten interpretive resources to 
justify its holdings in these two subject matter areas. For each 
resource, we report reliance as a percentage of the total number of 
majority decisions in that area (158 in tax, 597 in workplace law) over 
the thirty-nine Supreme Court terms. 
Table 1: Mean Percent Reliance on Interpretive Resources in Tax 
and Workplace Law Cases, 1969–2008 
Resource Tax (N=158) Workplace (N=597) 
Text 66.5 60.6 
Dictionary 6.3   4.4 
Language Canons* 29.7 20.8 
Legislative History* 55.7 41.5 
Legislative Purpose* 51.9 79.4 
Legislative Inaction 5.7   6.4 
Supreme Court Precedent 81.6 81.6 
Common Law Precedent* 5.1 13.6 
Substantive Canons 14.6 12.1 
Agency Deference 19.0 18.9 
*Indicates significant difference between tax and workplace decisions. 
These results indicate that the Court invokes a number of 
important resources with comparable frequency when construing tax 
and workplace statutes. For instance, the Justices relied on the 
inherent or plain meaning of textual language in 66.5 percent of 
majority tax opinions and 60.6 percent of their majorities in 
workplace law. The extent of the Court’s reliance is virtually identical 
with respect to agency deference (at 19 percent) and also Supreme 
Court precedent (at 82 percent). The Court’s consistently high 
dependence on its own case law presumably reflects two constants: 
the parties’ contentions that some aspect of Court precedent supports 
their position, and the Court’s institutional interest in enhancing 
perceptions of stability and continuity by reference to its prior 
decisions.81 
 
 81. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—Foreword, A Judge on 
Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 30–31 (2002) 
(emphasizing that judicial departures from precedent are the exception and should be made 
explicit to promote confidence in a stable and predictable legal order); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 
Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 286–87 (1990) (stating that 
the Court’s respect for its own previous opinions is a key element of the judicial power 
prescribed by the Constitution); John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983) (observing that the institutional strength of the judiciary is linked to 
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At the same time, the Court in tax law decisions relies 
significantly more on both legislative history and language canons—
and somewhat more on substantive canons—than it does in labor and 
employment cases.82 Given the persistence of ideologically tinged 
tensions between the canons and legislative history in the workplace 
law area,83 it is intriguing that tax law majorities rely so much more 
often on both the semantic resource of language canons and the 
political resource of legislative history. Both of these interpretive 
assets encompass a highly specified and discrete set of components. 
Legislative history includes nine basic types of particular legislative 
record documents,84 and language canons incorporate a larger but still 
identifiable list of particular semantic or structural maxims.85 
By contrast, the Court relies significantly less on legislative 
purpose in tax law than in workplace law.86 That the Justices invoke 
 
the public perception of judges deciding like cases in the same way). See generally ROSCOE 
POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923) (describing law’s challenge to 
reconcile the need for stability and the need for change). 
 82. The use of “significant” refers to results that are statistically significant using a two-
tailed t-test for difference of means. A result that is significant at the .05 level (Pr(|T|>|t|) ≤ .05) 
has no more than a 5 percent chance of occurring purely as a coincidence. R. MARK SIRKIN, 
STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 178–89 (1995). All statistical analyses in this Article are 
run using Stata version 8. For simplicity, we refer to each result in this Article as “t=.xxx,” 
although the notation set forth above (Pr|T|>|t|) is more complete in that all reported values are 
probabilities of the t-value being based on chance. The differences identified in text are highly 
significant for both legislative history (t = .001) and language canons (t = .008); the difference is 
not significant for substantive canons (t = .200). 
 83. See supra text accompanying notes 35–37, 51–52. 
 84. The nine basic subsets for which we coded are House bills, Senate bills, House 
committee hearings, Senate committee hearings, House standing committee reports, Senate 
standing committee reports, House floor debates, Senate floor debates, and conference 
committee reports. Other legislative record documents (for example, joint committee reports, 
joint resolutions, presidential veto messages) are used less often by the Justices. 
 85. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, app. B at 19–23, 25–27. The language canons 
principally relied on by the Supreme Court are a subset of those listed in Appendix B—notably 
expressio unius, noscitur a sociis, ejusdem generis, the whole act rule and its “cousins” the 
presumption against redundancy and the presumption to avoid surplusage, the presumption of 
consistent usage of a term throughout the statute, and in pari materia. 
 86. This difference is again highly significant (t = .000). The Court’s reliance on common 
law precedent also differs significantly between tax and workplace law, but we do not focus on it 
in our discussion. The Court’s reliance on common law precedent in tax law is truly rare—lower 
than for any other resource. But see, e.g., Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 15, 19 (1980) 
(construing a criminal statutory provision of the Internal Revenue Code in light of former 
common law distinctions between principals and accessories); United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 
707, 712 (1980) (analogizing the taxpayer duty to comply with an IRS summons to the common-
law duties attached to the issuance of a testimonial summons). The Court’s greater reliance in 
workplace law (still only 13.6 percent) is driven by a very high reliance on common law 
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considerations of purpose in four-fifths of their workplace law 
majorities stems in part from this resource’s soft and rather expansive 
boundaries. Unlike our coding of language canons and legislative 
history, in which we require the Court to refer to particular maxims 
or specific congressional documents, we code legislative purpose 
based on the Court’s more open-ended reference to policies or values 
that the statute is meant to protect87 or goals that Congress must have 
had in mind.88 The inferential nature of such attributions broadens the 
domain of this interpretive asset in workplace law, in which remedial 
policies and redistributive goals are regarded as integral to 
congressional motivation, at least for the enacting coalition. This kind 
of explicitly purposive cross-referencing by the Court is somewhat 
less prevalent when it comes to tax statutes. The difference may arise 
because the Justices are not familiar or comfortable enough with the 
underlying tax policies to impute them to Congress on such a regular 
basis.89 Further, the Court’s greater reliance on specifically delineated 
resources like language canons and legislative history in tax cases may 
reduce the appeal of pursuing amorphous considerations of legislative 
purpose.90 
Our principal focus is on legislative history and the canons. Table 
2 breaks down the Court’s pattern of reliance over time for those 
 
precedent for general negligence statutes (50 percent) along with an above-average reliance for 
retirement-related laws (27.5 percent) and labor relations statutes (20.2 percent). 
 87. See, e.g., Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 558–60 (1997) (relying on 
statutory purpose in the workplace context); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 
U.S. 546, 565 (1993) (relying on statutory purpose in the tax context). 
 88. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231–34 (2000) (relying on the purpose 
imputed to Congress in the workplace context); United States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224, 240 (1994) 
(relying on the purpose imputed to Congress in the tax context). 
 89. Policy preferences are embedded in tax statutes: even an avowedly revenue-neutral law 
like the Tax Reform Act of 1986 features important policy choices. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 
62 (1985) (reporting the estimated revenue-neutral effect); id. at 94 (discussing reasons for 
expanding earned income credit); id. at 82–89 (discussing reasons for adjusting marginal tax 
rates). And there are a substantial number of tax majority opinions that explain tax policies or 
concepts by imputing purposive considerations to Congress. See, e.g., Irvine, 511 U.S. at 234, 240 
(discussing the purpose behind a code provision addressing the federal gift tax treatment of 
disclaimers); Comm’r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974) (discussing the purpose behind 
the code provision regulating depreciation of capital equipment). Still, our suggestion in the text 
is meant to help explain why purpose is invoked in only one-half of the tax majority opinions 
(51.9 percent) as opposed to four-fifths of the workplace law majorities (79.4 percent). That the 
Court relies significantly more often on purpose in workplace law majorities may well reflect the 
Justices’ greater levels of confidence when explaining and amplifying workplace policies. See 
generally infra Part III. 
 90. For a discussion of why tax law decisions feature distinctive kinds of reliance on 
legislative history and language canons, see infra Parts III.A–B. 
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resources, along with text and legislative purpose, by distinguishing 
between the Burger Court era and the Rehnquist/Roberts years. 
These results suggest that the Court’s reasoning approach has 
evolved in two distinct ways. First, key differences between tax law 
and workplace law reasoning during the Burger period have 
narrowed since 1987. In the Burger years, the Justices were 
significantly more likely to rely on both text and language canons in 
tax cases than in workplace decisions; those discrepancies are no 
longer significant for cases decided during the Rehnquist/Roberts era. 
The Court’s propensity in tax cases to invoke legislative history more, 
and legislative purpose less, than in workplace decisions remains 
significant across both periods. But the convergence of the Justices’ 
reliance on the two major textualist resources—even as reliance on 
each resource has increased over time—suggests that the Court has 
adopted a more uniform approach to semantic reasoning. 
Table 2: Reliance on Selected Interpretive Resources—Burger Court 
Decisions and Rehnquist/Roberts Court Decisions 
Resource Tax Percentage Workplace Percentage 
Burger Court                 (N=86) (N=301) 
Text* 64.0 54.2# 
Language Canons* 26.7 14.0# 
Legislative History*   62.8# 52.2# 
Legislative Purpose* 53.5 85.7# 
Substantive Canons 12.8  8.6# 
   
Rehnquist/Roberts Court (N=72) (N=296) 
Text 69.4 67.2# 
Language Canons 33.3 27.7# 
Legislative History*   47.2# 30.7# 
Legislative Purpose* 50.0 73.0# 
Substantive Canons 16.7 15.5# 
*Indicates significant difference between tax and workplace law decisions. 
#Indicates significant difference between Burger Court and Rehnquist/Roberts court 
decisions. 
Second, the Court’s reliance on key resources is more volatile 
over time in workplace law than in tax law. For labor and 
employment decisions, reliance on all five of the resources listed in 
Table 2 changed dramatically between the Burger era and the 
Rehnquist/Roberts years: the Justices’ use of text, language canons, 
and substantive canons significantly increased, whereas their use of 
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legislative history and legislative purpose significantly decreased. By 
contrast, the only significant change between eras in the Court’s use 
of resources for tax cases involved the declining use of legislative 
history. The lack of significant change in reliance on text, language 
canons, substantive canons, and legislative purpose reflects a greater 
continuity in methodological approach with regard to tax decisions. 
Relatedly, whereas we previously found an ideological tension 
between majority use of canons and dissent reliance on legislative 
history in workplace law cases during the Rehnquist years,91 this 
tension is absent from the Justices’ relatively stable use of those 
resources in tax law cases.92 The Justices’ unwillingness to use the 
canons in such an instrumental or policy-conscious manner is 
consistent with the contention that tax law and tax litigation in 
general are not as ideologically focused or divisive as workplace law. 
 
 91. See supra text accompanying notes 36–37. 
 92. Indeed, there are only two Rehnquist-era tax decisions in which the majority relies on 
canons but not legislative history while the dissent relies on legislative history: Commissioner v. 
Lundy, 516 U.S. 235 (1996) (a progovernment decision) and Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 
U.S. 438 (2002) (a protaxpayer decision). By contrast, there are sixteen such workplace law 
decisions during the Rehnquist era, including the Sigmon Coal case, which is also in the tax 
dataset. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18, at 68. During the Burger era this tension 
between canons and legislative history was not a factor; there were three workplace decisions 
and three tax decisions in which the majority relied on canons but not legislative history while 
the dissent relied on legislative history. Id. (noting the existence of three workplace decisions). 
BRUDNEY IN FINAL2.DOC 5/5/2009  4:02:09 PM 
1258 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1231 
Trends in Reliance: Legislative History and Canons,  
Majority Opinions 1969–2008 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
69-78 79-88 89-98 99-07
Court Term
% of Majority Opinions 
Using Legislative History or 
Canons
LH Tax
LH Workplace
Canons Tax
Canons Workplace
 
Still, a key theme across subject matter areas is that the Court’s 
reliance on legislative history has declined and its reliance on canons 
has increased, as shown in the graph above.93 Indeed, there has been a 
precipitous decline in legislative history usage for tax decisions in the 
past decade, eliminating the differential in reliance on that resource 
between tax and workplace law cases. 
 A final element of our overview of the differences between tax 
law and workplace law reasoning involves the possibility that the 
Court may be more closely divided in one area than the other. To 
explore this possibility, we grouped each dataset into four categories, 
depending on whether the Court’s decision (i) was unanimous (zero 
dissenters); (ii) enjoyed a wide margin of support (vote differential of 
five, six, or seven); (iii) was supported by a moderate-size majority 
(vote margin of three or four); or (iv) was a close case (vote margin of 
 
 93. For this graph, we grouped cases by ten-year intervals. Thus, for instance, for the 
period from 1979–88, the Court relied on legislative history in 66 percent of its tax majorities 
and 54 percent of its workplace majorities; it relied on canons in 38 percent of its tax majorities 
and 21 percent of its workplace majorities. Although the same trends occur when measured at 
eight-year or five-year intervals, the normal fluctuations in intervals smaller than ten years 
resulted in largely incomprehensible graphs. 
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one of two). Table 3 reports the size of majorities for tax and 
workplace law cases over the entire thirty-nine year period. 
Table 3: Comparing the Size of Majority Opinion Margins,  
1969–2008 
Size of Majority Tax Majorities Percentage 
(N=158) 
Workplace Majorities 
Percentage (N=597) 
Unanimous 42.4 42.7 
Wide* 26.0 19.1 
Moderate 21.5 16.8 
Close* 10.1 21.4 
*Indicates significant difference between tax and workplace decisions. 
Tax law decisions are significantly less likely to be close cases 
and significantly more likely to be decided by a wide margin 
(meaning either one or two dissenting votes). Remarkably, there have 
been only two close tax law cases in the entire Rehnquist/Roberts 
period, whereas almost one-fifth of all workplace law cases were close 
during this same period.94 The differential on close cases further 
contributes to the impression that tax law cases are less ideologically 
divisive then their workplace law counterparts.95 
We also examined the proportion of close cases for each subject 
area in which the majority invokes legislative history, language 
canons, or substantive canons. We found that the Court relies on 
legislative history significantly more often in close workplace law 
cases than in all other workplace decisions, and the Court’s added 
reliance on substantive canons in close workplace law decisions 
 
 94. The exact differential is 2.8 percent versus 19.2 percent, which is highly significant (t = 
.0003). During the Burger era, tax law decisions were close 16.3 percent of the time, whereas 
workplace law cases were close 23.6 percent of the time; that difference only approaches 
significance (t = .075). 
 95. There is some debate among tax law scholars about whether and in what ways federal 
judges may be ideologically divided in this area. See, e.g., Staudt et al., supra note 71, at 1815–21 
(finding that Justices’ political preferences have explanatory value for the subset of Supreme 
Court decisions involving corporate taxpayers but not for the subset involving individual 
taxpayers); Daniel M. Schneider, Using the Social Background Model to Explain Who Wins 
Federal Appellate Tax Decisions: Do Less Traditional Judges Favor the Taxpayer?, 25 VA. TAX. 
REV. 201, 204, 237 (2005) (finding that appellate judges appointed by Democratic presidents are 
more likely to issue protaxpayer decisions in certain settings). We do not explore the influence 
of judicial ideology in this Article not only for reasons of space but also based on lingering 
doubts as to a proper classification approach. See generally infra note 289. Still, given that only 
one in ten tax cases is closely decided and more than two-thirds are unanimous or have at most 
two dissents, the area does appear less divisive than workplace law. 
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approaches significance.96 By contrast, the Court’s reliance on 
legislative history, substantive canons, and language canons in close 
tax law cases versus all others does not even approach being 
significant.97 The fact that legislative history is disproportionately 
invoked in 5–4 workplace decisions—but not in closely divided tax 
cases—suggests that the Justices are comfortable seeking guidance 
from such history when they have strong disagreements about the 
meaning of workplace law text. This variation with respect to close 
cases points toward an important difference in legislative history 
justifications between tax and workplace law decisions. 
B. Comparing Reliance on Types of Legislative History 
In previous articles analyzing the role of legislative history in 
workplace law cases, we determined that the Court regularly relied 
on this history to help illuminate or explain the details of legislative 
bargains.98 Our findings focused on the eight most liberal Justices and 
how often they invoked legislative history to identify or describe 
these bargains, including compromises that supported results 
inconsistent with their presumed policy preferences.99 Other scholars 
have recognized the importance of legislative history to reflect or 
elaborate on the negotiated deals that are integral to congressional 
lawmaking.100 
Legislative history’s role in capturing elements of this 
dealmaking may be especially robust in certain ideologically charged 
areas of substantive law, where bill managers and principal sponsors 
agree to postintroduction changes to build majority support or 
overcome a filibuster. Labor relations and civil rights are two 
examples, but environmental law is another field in which such 
 
 96. For reliance on legislative history, the difference is 51percent in close cases versus 39 
percent in all others (t = .008). For reliance on substantive canons, the difference is 16 percent in 
close cases versus 11 percent in all others (t = .052). 
 97. Complete results for these analyses are on file with the Duke Law Journal. 
 98. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 146–60; Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 62, 
at 226–28. 
 99. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 137–60. 
 100. See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 32, at 607; Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 61, at 1420–
23. 
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tradeoffs or compromises are relatively common and are often 
reflected in legislative history.101 
Not every area of federal law is as ideological or partisan as labor 
relations and civil rights. In this regard, we have observed that the 
Court’s general approach and reasoning in tax law cases seem less 
policy oriented and less polarized than its treatment of workplace 
law. The Justices issue far fewer closely divided decisions in tax law, 
their reasoning patterns are more stable or consistent between major 
time periods, and they pay notably less attention to broad 
considerations of congressional purpose.102 Given these initial 
findings, plus the fact that tax law involves more technically complex 
and specialized concepts than most other areas of federal law, it is 
reasonable to consider whether the Court relies on legislative history 
in the tax area for distinct reasons—specifically to borrow expertise 
from knowledgeable congressional sources rather than primarily to 
identify the legislative bargain reached by competing interested 
parties. 
With this expertise-borrowing hypothesis in mind, we identify 
ten different types of legislative history on which the Justices rely 
when their decisions feature majority use of legislative history. Table 
4 reports findings for our two subject matter areas. 
 
 101. See, e.g., Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 61–
63 (1987); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125–29 (1985); Train 
v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 11–23 (1976). 
 102. See supra Table 2: Reliance on Selected Interpretive Resources—Burger Court 
Decisions and Rehnquist/Roberts Court Decisions, Table 3: Comparing Size of Majority 
Opinion Margins, 1969–2008 and accompanying text. 
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Table 4: Mean Percent Reliance on Legislative History Sources 
When Legislative History Is Present, 1969–2008 
Resource Tax (N=88) Workplace (N=247) 
House Committee Report* 68.2 56.9 
Sen. Committee Report* 78.4 54.0 
Conference Committee Report* 14.8 26.6 
House Floor Debate* 12.5 30.2 
Senate Floor Debate* 14.8 53.6 
House Hearing 11.4 15.3 
Senate Hearing 17.0 14.5 
House Bill   3.4   6.9 
Senate Bill   4.5   8.9 
Other Legislative History 14.8 22.6 
*Indicates significant difference between tax and workplace decisions. 
These results support our theory that the Court is more inclined 
to invoke legislative history for expertise-borrowing reasons in tax 
law cases but more apt to use that history to explain legislative 
compromises in workplace law decisions. The Justices are 
significantly more likely to invoke floor debates and conference 
committee reports in their workplace law decisions than in tax law 
opinions.103 These forms of legislative record evidence tend to address 
changes in text that are agreed to between introduction and 
enactment: amendments and failed amendments proposed on the 
floor to alter the text approved by a standing committee, and 
conference committee action reconciling the different versions of text 
approved by the two chambers. Such legislative history, narrating and 
accompanying a bill’s internal progress toward congressional 
approval, is useful principally to help understand the components and 
implications of the final legislative deal. 
On the other hand, the Justices are significantly more likely to 
rely on House and Senate standing committee reports in tax opinions 
 
 103. For House and Senate floor debates, the differences are significant not only over the 
entire thirty-nine-year period but also in both the Burger era and the Rehnquist/Roberts years. 
For conference committee reports, the differences approach significance in both the Burger era 
(t = .052) and the Rehnquist/Roberts years (t = .059). In addition, Senate bill language is relied 
on more often in workplace than in tax cases; this difference approaches significance for the 
thirty-nine-year period (t = .097) and also the Burger era (t = .064). 
The subset of “other legislative history”—notably reports by joint or advisory 
committees, special commissions, and executive agencies, as well as postenactment history or 
“constitutional history” from eighteenth or nineteenth century debates—also is used more often 
in workplace law cases; this difference approaches significance (t = .060). 
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than is true for workplace law decisions.104 Indeed, there is a striking 
disparity in tax cases between the Court’s reliance on standing 
committee reports and any other legislative history sources. As the 
following graph indicates, the Justices invoke these committee reports 
in their tax majorities five to six times more often than records of 
hearings, floor debates, or conference committee deliberations.105 We 
observed in Part I.A106 that the reports issued by the House and 
Senate standing committees—reports drafted primarily by the staff of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation—are a key source of technical and 
specialized knowledge in producing and explaining tax legislation. 
The Court’s extraordinarily high reliance on reports from those 
standing committees suggests a judicial mindset oriented toward 
expertise borrowing. 
We are not contending that the Justices invoke legislative history 
in a given case simply to borrow expertise or solely to help explain a 
bargain. The Court generally includes two or more different kinds of 
legislative record documents as part of its workplace law reasoning;107 
in doing so, the Court may well be benefitting from expert 
contributions as well as describing the deal. 
 
 104. For Senate committee reports, the difference is significant both in the Burger era 
(t = .000) and during the Rehnquist/Roberts years (t = .027). For House Committee reports, the 
difference is significant in the Burger era (t = 0.32). 
 105. In workplace law cases, the Justices rely on committee reports two to three times more 
often than most other legislative record documents—and they invoke Senate floor debates 
virtually the same amount as committee reports. 
 106. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 107. The Court relies on almost three legislative record sources for each workplace law 
decision invoking legislative history, but on less than 2.5 sources in each tax law case. This 
difference (a 2.90 mean versus a 2.40 mean) is highly significant for the thirty-nine year period (t 
= .004); it also is significant for both the Burger years (t = .030) and the Rehnquist/Roberts era (t 
= .018). 
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Supreme Court Reliance on Types of Legislative History:  
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Further, the Court relies on standing committee reports from each 
chamber more than half the time in workplace law as well as tax law 
decisions, and those reports sometimes describe or elaborate on 
legislative bargains as well as explaining complex or technical aspects 
of text. Still, the Court’s pattern of reliance in tax cases—invoking 
committee reports three-fourths of the time but largely ignoring other 
documents on which it so often relies in workplace decisions—
suggests that something distinctive takes place in the tax law area. 
In considering the different functions that legislative history may 
serve in tax and workplace decisions, we also examined how often 
dissent reliance on legislative history accompanies majority reliance 
on that history. We determined that when the majority invokes 
legislative history in its nonunanimous workplace law decisions, the 
dissent is significantly more likely to use legislative history than when 
such history is not part of the majority’s reasoning.109 It may be that 
 
 108. For identification of the principal types of legislative history that we coded, see supra 
note 84. 
 109. The likelihood is highly significant for the Burger years (t = .000), the 
Rehnquist/Roberts years (t = .000), and the entire thirty-nine-year period (t = .000). 
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the Justices are prepared to argue about what exactly the legislative 
deal or bargain was because the legislative record contains plausible 
(at least to the Justices) competing understandings.110 For tax law 
decisions relying on legislative history, however, the likelihood of 
dissent reliance on legislative history is not close to significant.111 
Table 5 reports the percentage of decisions for both subject areas in 
which the majority’s reliance on legislative history in nonunanimous 
decisions is accompanied by dissent use of legislative history. 
Table 5: Comparing Frequency of Legislative History Reliance in 
Both Majority and Dissent for Nonunanimous Cases 
 Tax Workplace 
Percent of All Years (Tax N=51; Workplace N=162) 35* 62 
Percent of Burger Years (Tax N=35; Workplace N=109) 40* 65 
Percent of Rehnquist/Roberts Years (Tax N=16; Workplace N=53) 25* 55 
*Indicates significant difference between tax and workplace decisions. 
The Justices disagree far less about the meaning of legislative history 
in tax cases than in workplace decisions. This conclusion is consistent 
with our theory that the Justices’ use of tax legislative history is more 
about borrowing expertise than understanding the bargain. It seems 
reasonable to infer that the Justices’ infrequent level of disagreement 
about legislative history in tax cases is due in part to a comparatively 
modest level of contested understandings among key congressional 
actors about the evolving meaning of text from bill introduction to 
enactment. The accompanying tax legislative history—especially 
committee reports on which the Justices so heavily rely—is therefore 
more likely to focus on explicating the arcane and technical substance 
of tax law. Conversely, the Justices’ tendency to disagree about the 
meaning of legislative history in workplace law cases, and to invoke 
documents from multiple stages of the legislative process to buttress 
their respective positions, suggests that the Justices’ focus in these 
cases is on understanding the legislative bargain. 
 
 110. Apart from the floor debates and conference committee reports discussed, see supra 
note 103 and accompanying text, another possible source for these competing understandings is 
standing committee reports that include extensive minority views. These minority views are 
present far more often in committee reports accompanying workplace statutes than reports 
accompanying tax statutes. See infra notes 176–77 and accompanying text. 
 111. The likelihood is not close to significant for the thirty-nine-year period (t = .41), nor is it 
close to significant for the Burger period (t = .46) or the Rehnquist/Roberts years (t = .43). 
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C.  Comparing Reliance on Types of Language and Substantive 
Canons 
As discussed in Section A, the Court has relied increasingly on 
language canons and substantive canons to help explain or justify its 
tax and workplace law decisions.112 Although the Justices’ use of the 
canons has expanded dramatically in the workplace law area, reliance 
on both language and substantive canons remains somewhat higher 
for tax cases than workplace decisions. In this Section, we address 
certain subsets of language and substantive canons invoked by the 
Justices in their tax and workplace law opinions. Our interest here is 
in whether—as appears true for legislative history—the Court uses 
canons in somewhat different ways for each subject area, and, if so, 
what factors might explain or account for this variation. 
For these purposes, we have grouped language canons into two 
categories: (i) presumptions about the meaning attributed to 
individual words113 or the linguistic inferences to be drawn from how 
those words are included, omitted, or arranged in a single phrase or 
sentence;114 and (ii) presumptions about the larger cohesion or 
structural integrity of the text, including especially the whole act rule 
and the related presumption against surplusage, and also 
presumptions about the relationship between words used more than 
once in different parts of the same statute or in similar statutes.115 
Table 6 reports our findings in the two subject matter areas, 
separating the two subsets of language canons for all cases that 
involve majority reliance on language canons. 
 
 112. See supra Table 2: Reliance on Selected Interpretive Resources—Burger Court 
Decisions and Rehnquist/Roberts Court Decisions, Table 3: Comparing Size of Majority 
Opinion Margins, 1969–2008 and accompanying text. 
 113. We refer here primarily to the plain meaning rule, the presumption to follow ordinary 
rather than technical usage of terms, and the distinction between “may” and “shall.” 
 114. We refer here to maxims such as expressio unius, ejusdem generis, and noscitur a sociis. 
 115. We refer here to the presumption of statutory consistency (the same or similar terms in 
a statute should be interpreted the same way), the rule of in pari materia (similar statutory 
provisions in two comparable statutes should be applied in the same way), and the presumption 
that when two statutory provisions conflict the specific provision controls the general. 
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Table 6: Mean Percent Reliance on Language Canon Subsets  
when Language Canons are Present, 1969–2008* 
Although the number of majority opinions relying on language 
canons is only about one-half the number that rely on legislative 
history,116 certain interesting differences emerge between tax law and 
workplace law cases. The Court is significantly more likely to invoke 
structural cohesion canons and significantly less likely to rely on 
word- or sentence-meaning canons in its tax decisions than in its 
workplace law majorities. The Court’s heavier reliance on structural 
canons in tax cases stems primarily from shifts in use arising since 
1986.117 Put differently, the Court relies on structural canons five to six 
times more often than word- or sentence-meaning canons in tax 
majorities, whereas the ratio is only two or three to one in workplace 
law majorities. 
One possible explanation for the Court’s tilt toward structural 
canons in the tax area involves the unified and self-contained nature 
of American tax laws. Virtually all revenue statutes reviewed by the 
Court exist as additions or revisions to a single title of the U.S. 
Code.118 The Justices may well believe, even if subconsciously, that 
 
 116. In its tax law cases, the Court relied on legislative history in 89 majorities but on 
language canons in 48; in its workplace law cases the Court invoked legislative history in 247 
majorities and invoked language canons in 123 decisions. Although the lower sample size makes 
it harder to obtain statistical significance, see GONICK & SMITH, supra note 80, at 146–50, our 
key findings with respect to both language canons and substantive canons are significant. 
 117. For structural canons, the difference in reliance between tax and workplace cases is not 
significant during the Burger years (t = .351) but is highly significant for the Rehnquist/Roberts 
period (t = .008). 
 118. We refer to Title 26, the Internal Revenue Code. Occasionally tax cases arise under 
Title 11, the bankruptcy code, or Title 29, which contains ERISA. But the overwhelming 
majority of federal taxation cases arise under Title 26. 
Years Individual Words  
or Sentences 
Structural Cohesion 
or Integrity 
Tax   
All Years (N=47) 17.0 (8 of 47) 91.5 (43 of 47) 
Burger Years (N=23) 17.4 (4 of 23) 87.0 (20 of 23) 
Rehnquist/Roberts Years (N=24) 16.7 (4 of 24) 95.8 (23 of 24) 
Workplace   
All Years (N=123) 34.1 (42 of 123)   75.6 (93 of 123) 
Burger Years (N=42) 28.6 (12 of 42)  78.6 (33 of 42) 
Rehnquist/Roberts Years (N=81) 37.0 (30 of 81) 74.1 (60 of 81) 
*Percentages in each row add up to more than 100 because some cases rely on both 
types of canons. 
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presumptions about structural integrity—such as interpreting terms 
consistently or avoiding redundancies—deserve special respect in a 
regulatory scheme that is continuously amended and highly self-
referential.119 
On the other hand, workplace law statutes are more likely to be 
discrete and separate entities, located in numerous different titles of 
the U.S. Code.120 The Court is still committed to invoking structural 
integrity canons to help resolve the meaning of inconclusive text. But 
the presence of so many relatively minor workplace statutes, 
including many that are in essence “one-off” enactments,121 may have 
led the Justices to rely more often on narrower language-based 
maxims that address the meaning of individual words or sentences 
within each body of enacted text. 
Turning to the substantive canons, we group these into two 
categories as well. The first category consists of policy norms based 
on generally applicable legal principles such as presumptions to avoid 
constitutional issues or repeals by implication and rules disfavoring 
federal preemption of core state functions or implied waivers of 
sovereign immunity. The second category consists of policy norms 
grounded in particular subject matter policies such as presumptions 
favoring labor arbitration or respect for international maritime trade 
and presumptions disfavoring implied tax exemptions or restrictions 
on the Internal Revenue Services’s (IRS) summons power. Table 7 
reports our findings, separating reliance on these two subsets of 
substantive canons for all decisions that rely on substantive canons. 
 
 119. See, e.g., ROSENBERG & DAHER, supra note 71, at 11 (observing that the major code 
revisions occurred in 1939, 1954, and 1986, but that Congress has enacted code amendments 
almost every year); RICHARD GERSHON, A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE 
CODE § 1.02, at 2 (4th ed. 1999) (discussing Congress’s regular amendments to the 1986 code, 
including “fairly major changes” in 1991, 1993, and 1996); see also Richard L. Doernberg & Fred 
S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 891, 895 (1987) (book review) (referring to dozens of revisions in the code since 
its birth in 1913, and adding that from 1976 to 1984, “six different tax bills each affected more 
provisions than the 1969 [Reform] Act, even though none of these acts purported to reorganize 
the Code”). 
 120. For a list of workplace statutes found in eight separate titles of the U.S. Code, see supra 
note 70. 
 121. Examples of these one-off enactments are the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the 
Worker Adjustment Retraining Notification Act, and until 2008 the Americans with Disabilities 
Act. Even regulatory schemes amended several times, such as the National Labor Relations Act 
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, do not compare with the Internal Revenue 
Code, which is amended on an almost annual basis. See supra note 119. 
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Because the overall number of cases invoking substantive canons is 
relatively small, we do not break them down between the two eras. 
Table 7: Mean Percent Reliance on Substantive Canon Subsets  
when Substantive Canons are Present, 1969–2008* 
 General 
Applicability 
Subject Matter 
Specific 
Percent of All Years, Tax (N=24) 66.7 (16 of 24) 45.8 (11 of 24) 
Percent of All Years, Workplace (N=78) 93.2 (68 of 73) 6.8 (5 of 73) 
*Percentages in each row may add up to more than 100 because some cases rely on both 
types of canons. 
Once again, there are notable differences between the types of 
canons relied on in tax and workplace law. The Court in both areas 
relies heavily on substantive canons of general application. The 
Justices invoke the constitutional avoidance canon and the canon 
disfavoring implied repeals somewhat more often in tax cases,122 while 
relying far more on presumptions against waiving sovereign immunity 
and against preempting core state functions in workplace law.123 
The most striking distinction, however, involves how often the 
Court invokes judicial policy norms tailored to particular statutory 
subject matter. The Justices rely on tax-based canons in almost half 
the tax decisions in which they invoke substantive canons, but they 
turn to canons grounded in particular workplace-related issues in only 
7 percent of the workplace cases in which they use canons.124 The 
heavy focus on tax-specific substantive canons can be seen as a form 
of expertise borrowing, albeit less direct or rigorous than reliance on 
tax legislative history. The Justices may invoke policy norms like 
construing exceptions against the taxpayer or favoring the IRS’s 
summons power to support if not shape their responses to difficult 
doctrinal issues of tax law. They may well feel less need to make use 
of such targeted policy presumptions in workplace law because they 
 
 122. The Court’s use of the constitutional avoidance canon in tax decisions that rely on 
substantive canons is 16.7 percent (four of twenty-four cases) whereas in workplace law it is 12.3 
percent (nine of seventy-three cases). The Court’s use of the implied repeals canon in tax cases 
is 12.5 percent (three of twenty-four cases) whereas in workplace law it is 8.2 percent (six of 
seventy-three cases). 
 123. The Court in its workplace law decisions has relied on the sovereign immunity canon in 
eight majorities and the presumption against preemption in ten decisions. See Brudney & 
Ditslear, supra note 18, at 106 nn.438–39 (discussing six cases invoking the antipreemption 
canon). The Court in its tax law majorities has relied on either of the two canons in only one 
decision. 
 124. This difference in the use of subject-specific canons is highly significant (t = .000). 
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are more confident in their ability to resolve the underlying doctrinal 
questions. 
D. Justice Blackmun’s Impact in Tax Cases 
Individual Justices typically acquire diverse background 
experiences and considerable areas of expertise by the time they 
reach the Supreme Court. Justices Marshall and Ginsburg spent many 
years planning and litigating important employment discrimination 
and civil rights cases.125 Justices Breyer and Scalia taught 
administrative law and wrote about that subject in depth from a 
scholarly vantage point.126 Justice Blackmun was an accomplished tax 
lawyer for more than two decades before his appointment to the 
Eighth Circuit in 1959. During sixteen years with a private firm in 
Minneapolis and nine years as general counsel to the Mayo Clinic,127 
Blackmun not only practiced federal and state tax law; he also gave 
speeches and wrote articles reflecting his abiding interest in and 
knowledge of the field.128 
Justice Blackmun’s area of expertise seems to have dramatically 
impacted his majority opinion assignments. Table 8 lists the four most 
prolific majority opinion writers in tax and workplace law. We 
 
 125. See RANDALL W. BLAND, JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL: CRUSADER FOR 
LIBERALISM 30–177 (2001) (discussing Justice Marshall’s central role in litigating race 
discrimination lawsuits from 1934 to 1960); Neal A. Lewis, High Court Nominee Faces Easy 
Road Through Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1993, at A15 (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s role as a 
leading litigator for women’s rights). 
 126. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM passim (1982); 
Antonin Scalia, Separation of Functions: Obscurity Preserved, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. v passim 
(1982); see also Cindy Skrzycki, Interest Grows in Resurrecting Administrative Conference, 
WASH. POST, May 25, 2004, at E1 (describing Justices Scalia and Breyer as influential members 
of the Administrative Conference of the United States during their careers as law professors). 
 127. See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, HARRY A. BLACKMUN: THE OUTSIDER JUSTICE 40–62 
(2008) (discussing Justice Blackmun’s career in a Minneapolis law firm from 1934 to 1950 and at 
the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota from 1950 to 1959); Nomination of Harry A. 
Blackmun, of Minnesota, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 7 (1970) (identifying Blackmun’s 
professional background from 1934–59). 
 128. For speeches and panel appearances, see, for example, Blackmun Talks to Junior Bar 
on Income Tax Returns, HENNEPIN LAW., Feb. 23, 1939, at 6 (on file with the Harry A. 
Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box 12 [hereinafter Blackmun 
Papers]); Blackmun Named to Expert Panel, ROCHESTER POST BULLETIN, Oct. 5, 1953 (on file 
with the Blackmun Papers, supra, Box 12). For articles, see, for example, Harry A. Blackmun, 
The Marital Deduction and Its Use in Minnesota, 36 MINN. L. REV. 50 (1951); Harry A. 
Blackmun, The Physician and His Estate, 36 MINN. MED. 1033 (1953); Harry A. Blackmun, 
Federal Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates, 33 MINN. L. REV. 800 (1949) (book review). 
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calculated the Justices’ rankings based on the percentage of the 
Court’s tax or workplace decisions they authored during their 
tenure.129 
Table 8: Percentage of Majority Opinions Authored by the Four 
Most Prolific Justices in Tax and Workplace Law during Their 
Tenure on the Court 
 Tax Majorities  Workplace Majorities 
Blackmun 30.4 (34 of 112) Brennan 16.5 (62 of 376) 
Souter     18.8 (9 of 48) Stewart 14.4 (27 of 188) 
Marshall 16.5 (18 of 109) White 14.1 (59 of 418) 
Powell     13.7 (10 of 73) Thomas 14.0 (25 of 178) 
Justice Blackmun authored over 30 percent of all signed majority 
opinions in tax law during his twenty-four years of service. This 
proportion of the Court’s tax majorities is almost double that assigned 
to his nearest colleagues in tax law cases, Justices Souter and 
Marshall. It also is close to twice the proportion of workplace law 
majorities written by Justice Brennan, who was assigned more 
workplace law decisions than any other Justice.130 Blackmun authored 
a remarkable 40 percent of the federal tax decisions in which he voted 
for the majority result, and he wrote concurring opinions in an 
additional 7 percent of those decisions.131 Another way to understand 
Blackmun’s domination of the tax law area is to observe that in his 
twenty-four terms on the Court, he wrote as many tax majorities as 
were authored collectively by five other Justices—Brennan, White, 
Stevens, Rehnquist, and Scalia—who on average served over twenty-
six terms within our dataset.132 
 
 129. Each Justice authored at least nine majorities in tax law or workplace law. We excluded 
from our calculations the five per curiam decisions in tax law and the twenty-one per curiam 
statutory opinions in workplace law. 
 130. As the senior Associate Justice for fifteen terms (1975–76 through 1989–90), Justice 
Brennan would have assigned himself many of these workplace majorities. Justice Blackmun 
was senior Associate Justice for only his final term (1993–94) and would therefore have been 
assigned almost all of his tax majorities by others. 
 131. The exact figures are 39.1 percent (34 of 87) and 6.9 percent (6 of 87). The next highest 
Justice in tax decisions is Souter, who wrote 20.9 percent of the decisions in which he voted with 
the majority (9 of 43) and also authored concurrences in 7.0 percent of those cases (3 of 43). In 
workplace law, Brennan wrote 21.9 percent of the decisions in which he voted with the majority 
(62 of 283), and he wrote concurrences in another 8.5 percent (24 of 283). 
 132. Justice Brennan wrote eleven tax majorities from 1969–70 to 1989–90; Justice White 
wrote eight majorities from 1969–70 to 1992–93; Justice Stevens wrote seven majorities from 
1975–76 to 2007–08; Justice Rehnquist wrote five majorities from 1971–72 to 2004–05; Justice 
Scalia wrote three majorities from 1986–87 to 2007–08. 
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Justice Blackmun’s unusual influence in the tax law area extends 
beyond his role in majority decisions. He also authored seventeen 
dissents—more than any other Justice during his twenty-four terms 
on the Court. Indeed, Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion in over 
one-third of the nonunanimous tax decisions in which he had not 
authored the majority opinion.133 In addition, the Court issued five per 
curiam tax opinions, based only on the certiorari papers, between 
1970 and 1994. Blackmun authored three of these cases and dissented 
in the two others,134 and his dissent in one decision prompted a 
colleague to request more time to review the papers in the case.135 
Such per curiam opinions, decided without full briefing or oral 
argument, often reflect a certain level of subject matter confidence 
from the Justices, as they are rationalized primarily in terms of 
correcting perceived lower court errors rather than addressing close 
or complex legal questions.136 Since Blackmun retired in 1994, the 
Justices have issued no per curiam opinions in tax law although they 
have decided five workplace law statutory cases in summary fashion 
over the same period.137 Some of the Justices likely deferred to Justice 
 
 133. There were 67 nonunanimous tax decisions out of the 117 cases (including five per 
curiam decisions) during Justice Blackmun’s tenure. He authored 19 of those 67 nonunanimous 
opinions, and he wrote dissents in 17 of the remaining 48, or 35.4 percent. 
 134. See Letter from Lewis Powell to Harry Blackmun (Jan. 15, 1973) (on file with the 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 167) (asking Justice Blackmun to “[p]lease join me in 
your per curiam” opinion in United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257 (1973)); Memorandum from 
Harry Blackmun to the Conference (Dec. 18, 1980) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra 
note 128, Box 334) (introducing his per curiam opinion for HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 
U.S. 1 (1981)); Memorandum from Harry Blackmun to the Conference (Oct. 2, 1987) (on file 
with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 504) (attaching his per curiam opinion for 
Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3 (1987)); Fausner v. Comm’r, 413 U.S. 838, 839 (1973) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Comm’r v. Asphalt Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117, 123 (1987) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting in part). 
 135. Letter from John Paul Stevens to Antonin Scalia (May 12, 1987) (on file with the 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 484) (requesting more time to take into account Justice 
Blackmun’s opinion in Asphalt Products). 
 136. See generally EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 349–51 (9th ed. 
2007) (pinpointing and criticizing the purported justifications for per curiam opinions); Arthur 
D. Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court’s Exercise of Discretionary 
Review, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 795, 825–33 (1983) (cataloguing trends in the Court’s per curiam 
opinions throughout the 1970s). Although both Gressman and Heller are critical of this 
summary decisionmaking process, the Court’s absence of plenary consideration does seem to 
reflect a certain level of interest and assuredness. See, e.g., HCSC-Laundry, 450 U.S. at 5–8 
(summarily reversing a circuit court tax ruling that conflicts with several other courts); Clark 
County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001) (summarily reversing a circuit court 
workplace law decision in conflict with the decisions of other circuits). 
 137. The five per curiam decisions addressing workplace law statutory issues are Whitman v. 
Department of Transportation, 126 S. Ct. 2016 (2006); Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1195 
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Blackmun simply because they were not interested in tax law—
something Blackmun recognized inside the Court as well as in public 
statements.138 It is also quite likely, though, that Blackmun’s fellow 
Justices lacked confidence in their own knowledge about tax law 
concepts, and thus deferred to him more than they would in most 
other statutory areas.139 
Given Blackmun’s extraordinary role as a majority author in tax 
cases, we compare his approach to legislative history reliance with 
that of his colleagues. Table 9 presents our findings, broken down 
into three time periods: Blackmun’s sixteen terms on the Burger 
Court, his eight terms on the Rehnquist Court, and the fourteen 
terms since Blackmun left the Court. 
During Blackmun’s time on the Court, his fellow Justices relied 
heavily on legislative history to help explain their majority opinions—
indeed they did so slightly more often than Justice Blackmun did.140 
This substantial reliance persisted during the first eight years of the 
Rehnquist Court, even as Justice Scalia was directing sharp criticism 
at his colleagues for using legislative history at all, criticism that 
seemed to have a substantial effect on patterns of legislative history 
 
(2006); Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001); Clark County 
School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001); Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208 
(1998). 
 138. See Memorandum from Harry Blackmun to the Conference (Dec. 18, 1980) (on file 
with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 334) (referring humorously to “the eager 
appetite [I know] all of you have for tax cases” and introducing his per curiam opinion for 
HCSC-Laundry); Stuart Taylor, Reading the Tea Leaves of a New Term, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 
1986, at B14 (“If one’s in the doghouse with the Chief, he gets the crud. He gets the tax cases 
and the Indian cases, which I like, but I’ve had a lot of them.” (quoting Harry Blackmun, J., 
United States Supreme Court)). 
 139. See Erwin Griswold, Preface to BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., DISSENT WITHOUT 
OPINION: THE BEHAVIOR OF JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES, at xii 
(1975) (“[E]xcept for Justice Blackmun, it is hard to find a member of the present Court who 
has a real ‘feel’ for tax law.”). See generally Robert A. Green, Justice Blackmun’s Federal Tax 
Jurisprudence, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1998) (describing Justice Blackmun’s 
background in taxation issues and his jurisprudence in different classes of tax cases); Karen 
Nelson Moore, Justice Blackmun’s Contributions on the Court: The Commercial Speech and 
State Taxation Examples, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 29, 43–49 (1985) (clarifying Justice Blackmun’s 
role in harmonizing inconsistent decisions related to taxes affecting interstate and foreign 
commerce). Tax law also is not an area in which law clerks can readily compensate for their 
Justice’s own felt inadequacies. Law clerks are likely to have taken only a single basic tax course 
in law school, and they tend to be less interested in tax than other public law subjects. 
 140. We do not attach special importance to this difference in reliance: the fact that other 
Justices invoked legislative history so regularly while Justice Blackmun was on the Court is the 
salient point. For a suggestion that Blackmun’s use of legislative history may have served as a 
cue for his colleagues, see infra note 308 and accompanying text. 
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reliance in workplace law.141 Although Scalia pointedly refused to join 
some tax majorities that used legislative history during this eight-year 
period,142 there was no appreciable decrease in the use of legislative 
history while Blackmun remained on the Court. After Blackmun 
departed, however, the Court’s willingness to invoke legislative 
history in its tax majorities significantly declined.143 
Table 9: Comparing Justice Blackmun’s Reliance on Legislative 
History in Tax Cases with the Reliance of Other Justices*144 
 Blackmun 
Percent Reliance 
Others’ Percent 
Reliance 
Burger Years, 1970–86 60 (15 of 24) 69.4 (34 of 49) 
Rehnquist Years, 1987–94 50 (5 of 10) 64.3 (18 of 28) 
Without Blackmun, 1995–2008 — 34.4 (11 of 32) 
*Per curiam opinions are omitted from this analysis. 
This later development may to some extent be viewed as part of 
the broader downturn in reliance on legislative history dating from 
Scalia’s arrival in 1986. Yet the lack of a downturn in tax cases until 
the late 1990s stands in marked contrast to the pattern in workplace 
law, in which the other Justices’ reliance on legislative history 
declined sharply in the early years of the Rehnquist Court even as 
 
 141. See, e.g., Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 133 (reporting a substantial decline in 
legislative history reliance after 1986 for both proemployee and proemployer decisions); 
Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of 
Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 384–95 (1999) (discussing the decline since 
the 1980s). See generally John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Legislative Process, 62 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 33 (2006) (arguing that Justice Scalia has caused the Court to focus more on 
the text of the statute than legislative purpose). 
 142. See United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 371–73 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(criticizing the Brennan majority for invoking a Senate floor debate to discern legislative 
intent); Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 728 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (declining to join a 
portion of Justice Stevens’s majority that relies on House and Senate committee reports). 
Justice Scalia has continued this criticism since Justice Blackmun’s retirement. See United 
States. v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 215 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (declining to join a portion of Justice Souter’s majority opinion); Chickasaw Nation 
v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 86 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (declining to join a portion of 
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion). 
 143. The difference between the early Rehnquist years and the post-Blackmun period is 
highly significant (t = .002). The decline did not begin in the initial years after Justice 
Blackmun’s retirement, but by the late 1990s the Justices were relying substantially less on 
legislative history than they had during Blackmun’s tenure. Copies of year-by-year results 
during the 1990s are available from the authors. 
 144. We omitted the 1969–70 term from Table 9 because it precedes Justice Blackmun’s 
arrival on the Court. Blackmun was confirmed by the Senate in May 1970. 
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Justice Blackmun’s reliance held steady.145 We suggest in Part III that 
the delayed decrease in legislative history use for tax cases occurred 
only when Justice Blackmun—the Court’s reigning expert in this 
arcane field—retired. The remaining Justices had less of an appetite 
for the technical and specialized discussions of tax law concepts 
contained in committee reports. 
One of our findings with respect to the Court’s use of substantive 
canons appears consistent with the idea that other Justices may have 
been “reluctant specialists” when confronting tax law issues. We 
noted in Section C that the Justices relied on tax-specific substantive 
canons in eleven of their twenty-four majorities using substantive 
canons.146 It turns out that Justice Blackmun authored only one 
majority decision invoking such a tax-specific canon147 while his 
colleagues wrote ten. It is quite possible that Blackmun’s knowledge 
of tax law left him more comfortable using content-specific resources 
such as legislative history and past Supreme Court tax decisions, 
whereas his colleagues who understood tax law less clearly (and also 
had less substantive interest) were prepared to borrow more heavily 
from tax-based policy presumptions.148 
III.  EXPLORING SUPREME COURT REASONING IN TAX CASES 
Our discussion examines three principal areas of difference, 
identified in our results, between the Court’s approach to tax law and 
workplace law. Our prior articles on the Justices’ reasoning in 
 
 145. We compared legislative history reliance by Blackmun in workplace law majorities with 
reliance by all other Justices, using the same three time periods set forth in Table 9: 
Table 9A: Comparing Justice Blackmun’s Reliance on Legislative History in Workplace 
Cases with Reliance of Other Justices* 
 Blackmun Percent 
Reliance 
Others’ Percent Reliance 
Burger Years, 1970–86             50 (12 of 24) 53.6 (136 of 253) 
Rehnquist Years, 1987–94             50 (9 of 18)            33.3 (42 of 126) 
Without Blackmun, 1995–2008 —            27.6 (40 of 145) 
*Per curiam opinions are omitted from this analysis. 
 
 146. See supra Table 7: Mean Percent Reliance on Substantive Canon Subsets When 
Substantive Canons Are Present, 1969–2008. 
 147. See Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 401 (1984). 
 148. Justice Blackmun’s reliance on Supreme Court precedent tends to support this 
hypothesis: he relied on prior decisions in 91.2 percent of his majority opinions (31 of 34), 
compared to 80.1 percent reliance (96 of 119) by all of the other Justices. 
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workplace law serve as a baseline149: we devote primary attention here 
to pursuing how the Court’s reasoning in tax cases diverges from this 
baseline. We first address variations in the Court’s approach to 
legislative history because we believe this reflects the Justices’ 
appreciation for the distinctive ways in which Congress produces tax 
legislative history. We then discuss more briefly the Court’s 
differential approaches to the canons of construction: although less 
dramatic than the legislative history story, we suggest that these too 
reflect an understanding of certain distinctive elements in tax law. 
Finally, we consider the impact of Justice Blackmun’s prominent role 
in tax law cases and how deference to a single Justice in a subject 
matter area may affect the Court’s reasoning approach in that area. 
A. Legislative History 
Our results provide ample evidence that the Court’s use of 
legislative history varies markedly between tax and workplace law. 
Table 2 indicates that in both the Burger era and the 
Rehnquist/Roberts years the Court has relied on legislative history 
more often to help justify tax decisions than workplace decisions.150 
Table 4 establishes that when the Court relies on legislative history, it 
is significantly more likely to invoke standing committee reports in 
tax cases than in workplace cases but far more inclined to rely on 
conference committee reports and floor debates in its workplace 
decisions. And Table 5 establishes that for majority opinions invoking 
legislative history in nonunanimous cases, the dissent is significantly 
more likely to disagree about the meaning of that history in 
workplace decisions than in tax cases. We believe these results—
especially from Tables 4 and 5—reveal that the Justices value 
legislative history in the tax setting for distinctive reasons, quite apart 
from courts’ ordinary reliance on that history to help unpack the 
legislative bargain captured in text. 
1. Discerning Deals Versus Borrowing Expertise.  As many 
 
 149. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52; Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 62; Brudney & 
Ditslear, supra note 18. 
 150. The Court’s use of legislative history in tax cases declined sharply starting in the 2001 
term and continuing precipitously over the next six terms (2002–07). See supra note 93 and 
accompanying text and graph. Comparative data for the 2001–07 terms are available from the 
authors. The significant difference in reliance that persisted through most of the Rehnquist 
years has disappeared. We suggest why Justice Blackmun’s departure may be partly responsible 
in Part III.C. 
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scholars have observed, the inherent inefficiencies of Congress’s 
lawmaking process mean that substantial adjustment and compromise 
in the text of a bill following the bill’s introduction is the rule rather 
than the exception.151 The legislative history that accompanies each 
stage of the lawmaking process may shed light on the textual 
modifications or compromises that occur during this process. Because 
legislative deals are a well-recognized feature of congressional 
lawmaking, courts traditionally regard legislative history as valuable 
to help identify the existence of a negotiated compromise or to 
explain specific aspects of a bargain.152 
The Court’s workplace law decisions invoking legislative history 
regularly rely on this history to help discern or describe the deal. As 
we have previously demonstrated, the Justices emphasize legislative 
record evidence of explicit bargains reached during a bill’s 
postintroduction journey through Congress to indicate when and why 
specific employee rights or protections were traded away or 
secured.153 Further, legislative history often describes or elaborates on 
certain compromises reached at the preintroduction stage (such as 
employer defenses or exceptions) that were agreed to among 
interested parties.154 
We do not mean to suggest that the Court’s tax law 
jurisprudence never involves the interpretation of legislative bargains, 
especially bargains negotiated by members of Congress after a bill is 
introduced. In their tax law opinions, the Justices have on occasion 
used legislative history to help identify the point at which a 
compromise was reached and the specifics of that compromise. In 
 
 151. See, e.g., JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE 353–59 
(16th ed. 1995); ALAN GRANT, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 45–52, 65–66, 302 (5th ed. 
1994); JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 84–86 (2d ed. 
1995). For a discussion of the contrast with parliamentary efficiency in lawmaking and its 
implications for how courts use legislative history, see Brudney, supra note 63, at 43–48. 
 152. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 32, at 596; Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 61, at 
1422. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an 
Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877–79 (1975) (discussing the judiciary’s role in 
interpreting statutes to fulfill or further the original negotiated legislative deal). 
 153. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 150–51 & nn.113–16 (discussing the use of 
legislative history to identify compromises and citing seven Court decisions as examples); see 
also, e.g., Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 622–23 (2004); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 
250–63 (1994); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 820–23 (1980). 
 154. See, e.g., Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 570–74 (1999); Am. Tobacco 
Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 72–75 (1982); Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., 416 U.S. 653, 659–62 
(1974); see also Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 149 nn.93–98 (citing six additional 
decisions). 
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HCSC-Laundry v. United States,155 the issue was whether a nonprofit 
corporation providing laundry and linen supply services to public 
hospitals qualified for an income tax exemption under section 501 of 
the Internal Revenue Code.156 The Court found “conclusive support” 
for a negative answer in the legislative history, which revealed that 
the Senate’s effort to cover hospital-related laundry services in the 
text of section 501(e) was rebuffed by the House in conference, and 
that a Senate amendment proposed eight years later to add laundry 
services was defeated on the Senate floor.157 Similarly, in Bob Jones 
University v. United States,158 the Court invoked committee report 
commentary and Congress’s failure to act on proposed amendments 
to support its decision that racially discriminatory private schools did 
not qualify for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3).159 And in 
Commissioner v. Engle,160 the Court—rejecting the IRS position—
relied heavily on floor debates and conference committee narrative to 
justify its decision allowing taxpayers to take percentage-depletion 
deductions on revenues from their oil and gas leases.161 
Notwithstanding these examples, however, a far larger number 
of Court decisions construing the statutory meaning of substantive tax 
provisions162 rely on legislative history primarily for a different reason. 
 
 155. HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1 (1981). 
 156. Id. at 3–5. 
 157. Id. at 6–7. 
 158. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 159. See id. at 600–01. 
 160. Comm’r v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206 (1984). 
 161. Id. at 217–22; see also United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 275–81 (1978) (relying on 
Bankruptcy Act legislative history to establish that Congress meant to respond to the Treasury 
Department’s stated concerns by providing that a bankrupt company’s withholding taxes, 
collected from its employees but not paid over to the IRS, were nondischargeable). 
 162. We distinguish here between substantive and procedural aspects of the Internal 
Revenue Code. Certain sections of the code, such as subchapter C dealing with corporations, 
may present especially challenging or complex substantive questions. See infra Part III.A.3 
(discussing United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970); Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726 (1989)). 
By contrast, tax decisions that arise from procedural disputes tend to present issues with which 
the Justices are more familiar and about which they have more confidence—in these instances 
the Court’s reliance on legislative history is less likely to involve expertise-borrowing 
considerations. See, e.g., United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 352 (1997) (relying on 
legislative history to support the text-based conclusion that the equitable tolling doctrine does 
not apply to the limitations period for filing tax-refund claims); Bufferd v. Comm’r, 506 U.S. 
523, 530 n.10 (1993) (relying on legislative history to confirm that the three-year period for 
assessing shareholder tax liability runs from the filing date of a shareholder’s individual return, 
not the date of a corporation’s return); United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 
730 & n.14 (1985) (relying on legislative history to help justify enforcement of an IRS levy 
against a taxpayer bank); United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 310 & n.13 (1978) 
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The Justices in these cases use commentary and elaboration from 
standing committee reports as a form of expertise borrowing to help 
them understand and apply the often arcane and complex concepts 
contained in Internal Revenue Code legislation.163 Expertise-
borrowing majority opinions sometimes invoke committee report 
explanations to confirm or reinforce the apparent plain meaning of 
the text at issue.164 On other occasions, these majority opinions use 
committee report analyses and discussions to resolve disputes in 
which the Court acknowledges that the text at issue is ambiguous or 
indefinite.165 Whether the legislative record materials are used to 
resolve inconclusive language or to reinforce apparent meaning, the 
congressional commentary on which these opinions rely is less 
partisan or ideologically colored than much of the legislative history 
invoked in workplace law decisions. Before discussing some 
illustrative expertise-borrowing opinions, we explain why this more 
neutral and objective legislative history reflects the distinctiveness of 
the tax legislative process, especially the unique role played by the 
Joint Committee on Taxation. 
 
(relying on legislative history to help justify enforcement of an IRS summons to obtain evidence 
for use in a criminal prosecution). 
We also omit from consideration in this context Court decisions that rely on legislative 
history to help resolve a nonprocedural constitutional dispute. See, e.g., United States v. Int’l 
Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 859–60 (1996) (relying on the legislative history of the Export 
Clause to help support a conclusion invalidating a federal excise tax on premiums for insurance 
purchased by the taxpayer’s foreign subsidiaries); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–59 
(1982) (invoking legislative history to help support a conclusion that statutes requiring an 
Amish employer to pay social security taxes do not violate the First Amendment Free Exercise 
Clause); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 450–51 (1978) (using legislative history to 
help support a conclusion that a federal tax on state-owned aircraft used for patrolling highways 
does not violate the implied immunity of a state from federal taxation). 
 163. The Court, of course, deals with complex disputes on a regular basis. The complexity 
that encourages reliance on expertise tends to involve issues of an unusually technical nature, 
issues that judges view themselves as less capable of managing without input from specialists. 
See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 165 & n.54 (1973); 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1 (1994). 
 164. See, e.g., Portland Golf Club v. Comm’r, 497 U.S. 154, 161–63, 165–66 (1990); Comm’r 
v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 83–84, 90–93 (1977); Don E. Williams Co. v. Comm’r, 429 U.S. 569, 
575–76, 580–82 (1977); United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32, 42–46 (1976). For a 
discussion of the Williams and Foster Lumber decisions, see infra Part III.A.3. 
 165. See, e.g., Clark, 489 U.S. at 741–43; Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 370, 378 
n.10, 393–94, 399 & n.55 (1983); Fed. Power Comm’n. v. Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Div., 411 
U.S. 458, 461–62, 467–70, 471–73 (1973); Davis, 397 U.S. at 308–12. For a discussion of the Clark 
and Davis decisions, see infra Part III.A.3. 
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2. The Joint Committee on Taxation and the Production of 
Nonpartisan Expertise. Established under the Revenue Act of 1926,166 
the JCT consists of ten members of Congress: five members of the 
Senate Finance Committee and five members of the House Ways and 
Means Committee. JCT staff—including some forty economists, 
lawyers, and other tax professionals—are nonpartisan, serve both the 
House and Senate, and are concerned exclusively with tax-related 
issues.167 The JCT staff from early on have been integrally involved at 
every stage of the tax legislation process.168 
Most important for our purposes, the JCT staff are principally 
responsible for preparing committee reports, soliciting input from 
House and Senate committee staff, the Treasury Department, and the 
 
 166. Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 1203, 44 Stat. 9, 127–28 (1926) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 8022–23 (2006)). 
 167. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 55, at 3–4 (discussing the Committee staff’s 
role as nonpartisan, joint, and solely tax oriented). Our review of Congressional Directories 
going back to the 74th Congress indicates the JCT had five professional staff in 1936; that 
number grew to twelve in 1953 (83d Congress), twenty in 1973 (93d Congress), thirty-four in 
1983 (98th Congress), and thirty-eight in 2003 (108th Congress). Copies of relevant pages from 
Congressional Directories are on file with the Duke Law Journal. 
 168. At the predrafting stage, JCT staff work closely with Treasury Department officials as 
well as members of Congress to refine their revenue-related concepts into workable proposals. 
Both the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee often hold 
hearings on these emerging tax legislative proposals. JCT staff prepare a hearing pamphlet 
examining and analyzing the concepts to be addressed; they also may brief House and Senate 
committee members and answer questions raised by members and their staffs during the 
hearings. Until recently, markup in the House and Senate committees was based on these 
concepts and proposals instead of on the actual statutory language that is the focus of 
committee markups and votes for virtually every other law Congress produces. See, e.g., id. at 5–
6, 16; Ferguson et al., supra note 55, at 809–12; Livingston, supra note 55, at 833–34; Manley, 
supra note 55, at 1050–65; Woodworth, supra note 55, at 23–32. 
Since the mid 1990s, there has been a shift toward having statutory language available at 
markup, especially in the House. See Lecture, The Role of Tax Policy in the Development of Tax 
Legislation: Larry Woodworth’s Era and Now, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2006). For a 
discussion of the more traditional committee markup in which committee members examine, 
bargain over, and vote on the actual text of the bill, see CONG. QUARTERLY PRESS, 
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 482–84 (5th ed. 2000); WALTER J. 
OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 98–105 (7th ed. 2007). 
JCT staff also work with minority committee members and their staffs, upon request, to prepare 
markup alternatives. See Kenneth F. Thomas & William R. Stromsem, The Joint Committee on 
Taxation, TAX ADVISOR, Mar. 1980, at 181, 182 (discussing how the JCT staff advised members 
on opposite sides during floor debate). During or after the markup, JCT staff are part of an ad 
hoc team of experts drafting the text of the approved bill; they work with staff from the House 
and Senate committees, tax specialists in the House and Senate legislative counsel’s office, and 
the Treasury Department, with IRS staff at times providing technical advice. 
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IRS.169 These reports typically include detailed narrative explanations 
of the technical bill language, specific illustrations of how the bill is to 
apply in certain settings, and more general discussion of the problems 
with present law that the bill is meant to address and the ways in 
which the committee’s proposed solution will address them.170 The 
committee reports along with the text are thus collaborative staff 
efforts to translate and amplify the conceptual and policy decisions 
reached by House and Senate committees.171 
Tax law policies tend to be very complex, involving arcane 
terminology and highly technical concepts. The key participants in tax 
legislation recognize that the text alone cannot fully explicate these 
concepts.172 Indeed the technical, self-referential, and often obscure 
nature of Internal Revenue Code language means that explanatory 
materials are particularly important in an area likely to affect so much 
of the public.173 It is therefore not surprising that members voting on 
the House and Senate floor rely especially heavily on committee 
 
 169. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 55, at 6; Livingston, supra note 55, at 835; 
Ferguson et al., supra note 55, at 811–12. The JCT staff drafted only the more general 
explanatory portions of the committee reports in the 1960s; the technical explanations were 
initially written by the IRS and then reviewed and modified by JCT staff and others. See 
Woodworth, supra note 55, at 28. 
 170. See Ferguson et al., supra note 55, at 810; Woodworth, supra note 55, at 28; see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337 passim (1954); S. REP. NO. 99-313 passim (1986). 
 171. See Ferguson et al., supra note 55, at 810; Livingston, supra note 55, at 835; Moran & 
Schneider, supra note 55, at 892. JCT staff also play a central role during floor debates and in 
conference committee. Indeed, they are primarily responsible for incorporating relevant 
contributions into the statement of managers that is part of the conference agreement. See Joint 
Comm. on Taxation, supra note 55, at 6–7; Livingston, supra note 55, at 835–36; Ferguson et al., 
supra note 55, at 810; Woodworth, supra note 55, at 28–29. 
 172. See Ferguson et al., supra note 55, at 810; Woodworth, supra note 55, at 28–29; Joint 
Comm. on Taxation, supra note 55, at 6. 
 173. See Livingston, supra note 55, at 841; Moran & Schneider, supra note 55, at 892 
(contending that in light of tax language opacity, “a paragraph in a committee report can often 
illuminate a bit of aspiration that a sub-sub-subsection can only hint at”). In addition to 
committee reports, the JCT staff also prepares a postenactment legislative history document, 
commonly known as the Blue Book, in connection with major tax bills. Although it is principally 
a collation of the various preenactment committee reports, the Blue Book does include 
explanatory materials written following enactment. In spite of traditional concerns regarding the 
validity and value of postenactment legislative history, the Blue Book has been invoked on 
numerous occasions by lower courts and at least once by the Supreme Court. See Michael 
Livingston, What’s Blue and White and Not Quite as Good as a Committee Report: General 
Explanations and the Role of “Subsequent” Tax Legislative History, 11 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 91, 98–
122 (1994). 
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report explanations and elaborations to help them understand the 
technical bill language.174 
The value of this history, for both members and the Treasury 
Department, is enhanced because the committee reports are 
produced in such an unusually bipartisan and objective manner.175 
One clear indicator of the bipartisan nature of tax committee reports 
is the remarkable dearth of substantive minority views. Reports on 
major tax legislation often feature hundreds of pages of explanatory 
material with virtually no minority submission at all.176 By contrast, 
major workplace statutes enacted across the same decades (the 1940s 
through the 1990s) are replete with in-depth discussion and argument 
by members of the committee minority.177 Finally, tax committee 
reports perform a miniregulation function when, as often happens, 
the Treasury Department takes years to issue formal regulations on 
particular topics.178 
Admittedly, Congress’s overall lawmaking process has become 
increasingly partisan in recent times. This is particularly true in the 
House, in which the leadership after 1995 became more active in 
shaping legislation, standing committee roles were consequently 
somewhat diminished, and cooperation ebbed between the two 
 
 174. See Ferguson et al., supra note 55, at 810; Livingston, supra note 55, at 836. Tax 
committee reports typically include detailed, in-depth amplifications of what is contained in 
text. For examples, see infra note 176. This information is more comprehensive and often more 
comprehensible than what is found in floor debates or conference reports involving tax bills. 
 175. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 55, at 3–4; Ferguson et al., supra note 55, at 
807; Woodworth, supra note 55, at 24–25; Manley, supra note 55, at 1050–52. 
 176. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333 (1942) (187-page report accompanying the Revenue 
Act of 1942 with one member contributing a one-page dissent); S. REP. NO. 83-1622 (1954) (628-
page report accompanying the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 with no minority views); H.R. 
REP. NO. 99-426 (1985) (1072-page report accompanying the Tax Reform Act of 1986 with 
eleven members signing minority views totaling three pages); S. REP. NO. 105-33 (1997) (376-
page report accompanying the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 with no minority views). 
 177. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 80-245 (1947) (115-page report accompanying the Taft-Hartley 
Act with six members contributing 51 pages of minority views); H.R. REP. NO. 88-114 (1964) 
(133-page report accompanying the 1964 Civil Rights Act with eight members contributing 52 
pages of minority views); S. REP. NO. 100-62 (1987) (95-page report accompanying the Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act with five Senators signing 15 pages of minority 
views); S. REP. NO. 101-263 (1990) (73-page report accompanying the Older Workers Benefit 
Protection Act with five Senators contributing 21 pages of minority views). Whether the tax 
lawmaking process has become more partisan since 2000 is an open question. See H.R. REP. NO. 
107-7 (2001) (31-page report accompanying the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 2001 
with 17 members—every Democrat on the committee—signing the five-page dissenting views); 
see also supra notes 173–74 and accompanying text. 
 178. See Livingston, supra note 55, at 841. 
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chambers.179 These larger changes have not coincided with the 
development of a major tax reform measure such as the 1954 or 1986 
laws, but they may have made it harder for the JCT to perform its 
nonpartisan functions with respect to regular tax bills.180 Whether 
these trends will continue or the House will revert to a more 
traditional committee-dominated legislative approach is not yet clear. 
Still, the distinctive aspects of the tax lawmaking process 
described here remain substantially in place.181 Accordingly, the 
nature of tax legislation continues to make committee reports 
especially useful to members of Congress and other key participants 
in the lawmaking enterprise. As we now illustrate, the Supreme 
Court’s reliance on those reports reflects at least implicitly an 
appreciation for their special qualities. 
3. Illustrative Expertise-Borrowing Opinions.  There are some 
direct indications that the Justices understand the special nature of 
tax legislative history and its relationship to their own ability to 
master the enigmas and intricacies of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Justice Douglas, hardly one to shrink from construing technical 
statutory schemes, complained with some frequency that the Court 
does not hear enough tax cases to develop the needed level of 
expertise, and that the better route for resolving ambiguities in the 
tax code or its regulations would be to present the dispute to the Joint 
Committee on Taxation.182 There also have been a number of 
instances in which the Court majority relied on a JCT report or 
analysis (apart from the House and Senate committee reports drafted 
 
 179. See generally John H. Aldrich & David W. Rhode, Congressional Committees in a 
Partisan Era, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 249, 254–65 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. 
Oppenheimer eds., 8th ed. 2005); Eric Schickler & Kathryn Pearson, The House Leadership in 
an Era of Partisan Warfare, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra, at 207, 208; George K. Yin, 
Lecture, Is the Tax System Beyond Reform?, 58 FLA. L. REV. 977, 1020–23 (2006). 
 180. Cf. Yin, supra note 179, at 1029–38 (discussing challenges posed by these larger trends 
with respect to undertaking major tax reform in the future). Another influence on the substance 
and politics of tax legislation—changes in congressional budget procedures—is beyond the 
scope of this Article. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of 
Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1998). 
 181. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 55, at 1, 5–8; Lecture, supra note 168, at 6–7, 
12. 
 182. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 19 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); 
United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 114–15 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting); see also Bernard 
Wolfman et al., The Behavior of Justice Douglas in Federal Tax Cases, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 
320–25 (1973) (analyzing Justice Douglas’s evolution on tax cases to a point of mistrust of 
special interest favoritism of the Internal Revenue Code and viewing his contention that the 
Court should avoid tax cases altogether in light of this deep mistrust). 
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by JCT staff) to help understand what Congress truly meant to 
accomplish—by curatively limiting a tax deduction provision,183 
designing a particular windfall-profits tax scheme,184 or restricting 
utilities to certain depreciation methods.185 For the most part, 
however, the Court’s reliance on legislative history to borrow 
expertise occurs through its use of House and Senate committee 
reports. One example in which the Court invoked this legislative 
history to give meaning to inconclusive text is United States v. Davis;186 
the Court had to determine whether a shareholder’s redemption of 
stock in his own closely held corporation was taxable as ordinary 
income or capital gains.187 
The taxpayer in Davis received $25,000 when the company 
redeemed the one thousand shares of preferred stock he had 
previously purchased for $25 per share.188 He claimed that the 
purchase and redemption were undertaken for a valid business 
purpose and thus qualified as an exchange with no gain recognized. 
The IRS contended that the distribution constituted payment of 
dividends taxable as ordinary income.189 A corporation’s redemption 
of its stock is often taxed as a dividend, but section 302(b)(1) of the 
Internal Revenue Code treats redemptions “not essentially 
equivalent to a dividend” as exchanges.190 
Most courts of appeals had determined that a redemption was 
“not essentially equivalent to a dividend” if it was the final step in a 
course of conduct that had a business motivation rather than a tax-
avoidance purpose,191 but the Supreme Court held otherwise. Relying 
on House and Senate committee reports, Justice Marshall for the 
Court explained how the 1954 code’s predecessor language had 
developed in response to concerns that closely held corporations 
might avoid taxation by making certain kinds of distributions to their 
 
 183. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 31–32 (1994). 
 184. See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 85–86 n.15 (1983). 
 185. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Div. 411 U.S. 458, 471–72 
(1973). 
 186. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970). 
 187. Id. at 303–04. 
 188. Id. at 302–03. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 303–04 (discussing language of 26 U.S.C. § 302(b)(1) (1954)). 
 191. See id. at 303 n.2. 
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stockholders.192 Faced with widespread confusion generated by lower 
court interpretations of that earlier text, the authors of the 1954 Code 
sought to facilitate tax planning by providing “objective tests to 
govern the tax consequences of stock redemptions.”193 
Justice Marshall then explained how the “essentially equivalent” 
language had been added by the Senate Finance Committee as a 
means of narrowing the circumstances in which corporate 
redemptions would receive capital gains treatment.194 The Court 
quoted at length from the Senate report providing a “detailed 
technical evaluation of § 302(b)(1).”195 The Court’s excerpts from the 
report explained that 
in applying this test for the future . . . the inquiry will be devoted 
solely to . . . whether or not the transaction by its nature may 
properly be characterized as a sale of stock by the redeeming 
shareholder to the corporation. For this purpose the presence or 
absence of earnings and profits of the corporation is not material.196 
The Court inferred from this legislative history discussion that “by 
making the sole inquiry relevant for the future the narrow one 
whether the redemption could be characterized as a sale, Congress 
was apparently rejecting past court decisions that had also considered 
factors indicating the presence or absence of a tax-avoidance 
motive.”197 Justice Marshall also drew on Senate and House 
committee analyses of tax consequences associated with other types 
of corporate transactions to confirm that business purpose factors 
were not meant to be relevant under the “essentially equivalent” 
language of section 302(b)(1).198 The Court in Davis thus relied 
heavily on detailed technical explanations contained in the tax 
committees’ reports to overturn a fairly widespread precedent in the 
lower courts.199 
 
 192. See id. at 308–09 (quoting from a House committee report accompanying the 1926 
Revenue Act). 
 193. Id. at 309–10 (discussing a House committee report accompanying the 1954 code 
revision). 
 194. Id. at 310. 
 195. Id. at 311. 
 196. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 234 (1954)). 
 197. Id. at 311–12. 
 198. See id. at 311 n.11 (discussing the committee’s treatment of distributions involving 
partial corporate liquidations). 
 199. Justice Douglas, in a short dissent for himself and two other Justices, relied only on the 
text and made no reference to the legislative history. See id. at 313 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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A second, somewhat related, example of borrowing expertise 
from standing committee reports to resolve textual ambiguity is 
Commissioner v. Clark.200 The taxpayer in Clark—the president and 
sole shareholder of a business—agreed to merge his company into the 
wholly owned subsidiary of a publicly traded corporation.201 Under 
the terms of the merger, Clark was offered the choice of a large 
volume of common stock or a somewhat smaller volume of shares 
combined with a cash payment or “boot” of more than three million 
dollars.202 He took the latter offer: the issue was whether the boot was 
taxable as a long-term capital gain under the general rule of section 
356(a)(1) of the tax code or—as the IRS contended—taxable as 
ordinary income because the exchange had “the effect of the 
distribution of a dividend” under the exception provided in section 
356(a)(2).203 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, distinguished at the 
outset the Court’s earlier holding in Davis because this case involved 
an exchange pursuant to a merger of two corporations.204 Accordingly, 
the relevant code section was not 302(b)(1) but 356(a), covering 
exchanges pursuant to a corporate reorganization accompanied by 
additional consideration referred to as “boot.”205 Justice Stevens 
noted that the circuits were split on the rules for determining whether 
such exchanges had “the effect of the distribution of a dividend” and 
that the text itself was “admittedly ambiguous.”206 
After invoking Congress’s purpose generally to treat boot in 
reorganizations as capital gain and the general judicial preference to 
avoid an “expansive reading of a somewhat ambiguous exception,”207 
Justice Stevens turned to the legislative history. The House and 
Senate committee reports accompanying the Revenue Act of 1924 
elaborated on provisions later carried forward in substantially 
 
 200. Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726 (1989). 
 201. Id. at 731. 
 202. Id. “The term ‘boot’ is used because shareholders of the transferor corporation have 
received stock or securities of the acquiring corporation plus money (or other property) to 
boot.” See Allan J. Samansky, Taxation of Nonqualifying Property Distributed in 
Reorganizations, 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 1 n.1 (1980–81). 
 203. Clark, 489 U.S. at 731–32. 
 204. Id. at 728–29, 732 (finding that the merger qualified as a “reorganization” under 26 
U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (1954)). 
 205. Id. at 736–38; see also supra note 202. 
 206. Clark, 489 U.S. at 736–37, 741. For a thoughtful treatment of this issue prior to Clark, 
see Samansky, supra note 202, at 15–38. 
 207. Clark, 489 U.S. at 739. 
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identical form as section 356(a)(2).208 Justice Stevens inferred from 
this legislative history that Congress’s primary concern was to 
“prevent[] corporations from ‘siphon[ing] off’ accumulated earnings 
and profits at a capital gains rate through the ruse of a 
reorganization.”209 He then quoted at length from the one example 
relied on in both committee reports to illustrate what they meant 
when seeking to “prevent evasion.”210 Unlike the arm’s-length stock-
for-stock transaction at issue here, the committee report example set 
forth a situation involving “merely the creation of a wholly owned 
subsidiary as a mechanism for making a cash distribution to the 
shareholders.”211 
Importantly, Justice Stevens found it persuasive that in the 
committee’s most extensive consideration of the disputed text, there 
was no indication that bona fide exchanges between unrelated parties 
as part of a reorganization should be classified under the “avoiding 
tax evasion” purposes of section 356(a)(2).212 Indeed, although he 
recognized that the “has the effect . . . of a dividend” language of 
section 356 was “certainly similar” to the “essentially equivalent to a 
dividend” language of section 302, Justice Stevens noted that the 
Senate committee’s discussion of section 302(b)(1) focused on 
bypassing considerations of taxpayer motive whereas the committee 
reports here stressed the centrality of a motive standard.213 As in 
Davis, the Court in Clark invoked detailed committee report 
explanations to help explain ambiguous text in an area of technical 
complexity.214 
In a third instance, Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner,215 the 
Court borrowed expertise from legislative history to reinforce its 
reliance on text and other resources. The question presented was 
whether a company that contributed a promissory note to its 
 
 208. See id. at 742–43. 
 209. Id. at 742. 
 210. Id. at 742–43. 
 211. Id. at 742. 
 212. Id. at 743. 
 213. Id. at 743–44. 
 214. In a dissenting opinion, Justice White contended that the Court’s decision in Davis was 
controlling; he relied on the similarity in textual language and asserted that Congress in 1924—
as in 1954—intended the broadest possible reach for its tax treatment of corporate 
reorganization transactions. See id. at 747–48 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia joined the 
majority in its discussion of purpose, text, and canons, but not in its extensive reliance on 
legislative history. Id. at 728 n.* (majority opinion). 
 215. Don E. Williams Co. v. Comm’r, 429 U.S. 569 (1977). 
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employee profit-sharing plan “paid” the amount and therefore could 
deduct it in the earlier year under section 404(a) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, although the check satisfying the liability was not 
issued until the following year.216 The Court, supporting the IRS, held 
that the deduction was only allowed for the year the amount was 
paid, even for taxpayers using an accrual method of accounting.217 
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, relied initially on the 
text of section 404(a) and its relation to other sections of the code. He 
recognized that the tax code allows for both cash and accrual methods 
of accounting and that many of the code’s deduction provisions use 
the words “paid or accrued” or “paid or incurred.”218 He noted, 
though, that section 404’s simple use of “contributions . . . paid”219 
under a profit-sharing plan “stands in obvious contrast” to those 
numerous other provisions, and he reasoned that Congress meant to 
allow deductions for profit-sharing plan contributions only when 
actually paid rather than when accrued or incurred on a taxpayer’s 
books.220 
Justice Blackmun next reviewed the legislative history, which he 
found to be “consistent with the theme of the statute’s language.”221 
He invoked the House and Senate committee reports accompanying 
section 404’s substantially identical predecessor text from 1939 and 
1942; these reports discussed how an accrual-basis taxpayer’s deferred 
compensation to its employees was initially to be deductible in the 
year that “compensation is paid.”222 Blackmun turned to Senate 
hearing testimony from 1942 and committee report discussions from 
1948 and 1954 to explain that Congress responded to concerns about 
computational problems associated with this compensation-based 
approach by first creating and then extending a grace period for filing 
returns that allowed for the deduction of plan contributions when 
they were actually paid.223 
 
 216. Id. at 571–72. 
 217. Id. at 574–83. 
 218. Id. at 574. 
 219. Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 404(a) (1954)). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 575. 
 222. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333, at 106 (1942)); S. REP. NO. 77-1631, at 141 (1942)). 
 223. Id. at 575–76. Blackmun also relied on the conference report accompanying changes to 
the 1974 tax code that were part of ERISA to show that Congress in 1974 “reaffirmed the 
actual-payment requirement of § 404(a), and strengthened its enforceability.” Id. at 580 n.11 
(relying on H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 308 (1974) (Conf. Rep.)). 
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Finally, the majority used legislative history to refute the 
reasoning of the three circuits that had ruled against the IRS. The 
appellate courts had assumed that the word “paid” must encompass 
delivery of a promissory note because that same term in a different 
section of the tax code had been so applied. But Justice Blackmun 
pointed to the House and Senate committee report discussions 
accompanying that separate section to help explain why the policy 
concerns there were not analogous to those at stake under section 
404(a).224 
The majority in Don E. Williams Co. did not quote as extensively 
from committee report language as the Court did in Davis and Clark. 
Rather, Justice Blackmun used committee report excerpts from four 
different Congresses to establish a narrative that reinforced and 
elaborated on the majority’s formal textual analysis. In our final 
example, United States v. Foster Lumber Co.,225 the Court also 
referenced committee reports in more summary terms to reinforce 
the apparent plain meaning of text. 
In Foster Lumber, the taxpayer experienced a net operating loss 
of $42,000 and sought to carry over the loss as a deduction to offset 
taxable income from prior years, pursuant to section 172 of the 
code.226 The issue was whether the loss carryover was absorbed only 
by the ordinary income earned in a prior year, as the taxpayer argued, 
or was also absorbed by capital gains in that prior year, the IRS 
position.227 Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, stated that the 
“dispute . . . center[ed] on the meaning of ‘taxable income’ as used in 
§172(b)(2).”228 He then relied on code definitions of “gross income” as 
well as structural canon arguments, reasoning that taxable income is 
gross income minus allowable deductions and that gross income is “all 
income from whatever source derived,” including capital gains as 
“[g]ains derived from dealings in property.”229 
 
 224. Id. at 580–82. Justice Stewart, dissenting for himself and Justice Powell, relied on lower 
court decisions that he contended had properly construed the word “paid” to allow deductions 
for promissory notes; he found the majority’s use of legislative history unpersuasive. See id. at 
583–88 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 225. United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32 (1976). 
 226. Id. at 33–36. 
 227. Id. The taxpayer had $7,000 in ordinary income and argued that it therefore should 
have $35,000 of the $42,000 loss carryover available to offset income the following year. Id. at 
35–36. The IRS contended that because the taxpayer had capital gains of $167,000, the entire 
loss carryover was absorbed in the first tax year. 
 228. Id. at 36. 
 229. Id. at 36–37 (alteration in original) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (1964)). 
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As in Don E. Williams, the majority in Foster Lumber turned to 
legislative history for confirmation—“to consider, in short, whether 
the construction sought is in harmony with the statute as an organic 
whole.”230 Invoking an earlier Supreme Court opinion, the taxpayer 
argued that Congress’s sole purpose in allowing loss carryovers was to 
reduce the unduly harsh impact of taxing income strictly on a system 
of annual accounting.231 Justice Stewart responded that in deciding to 
allow income averaging, Congress was not seeking simply to eliminate 
arbitrary consequences but was pursuing other policy objectives as 
well.232 He cited a JCT report to explain that Congress also had in 
mind allowing shareholders in companies with fluctuating incomes to 
regularize their own tax treatment so that they did not in effect have 
to pay a tax on capital when compared to the owners of businesses 
with a more stable year-to-year income.233 And he relied on a House 
Report to maintain that loss carryovers were allowed in part “to 
stimulate enterprise and investment, particularly in new businesses or 
risky ventures where early losses can be carried forward to more 
prosperous years in the future.”234 Given these additional policy 
considerations, Justice Stewart reasoned that Congress’s willingness 
to provide for a more limited form of loss carryover comported with 
the pursuit of multiple goals.235 
The four decisions discussed here illustrate how the Court has 
used tax legislative history to elucidate the meaning of complex tax 
code concepts. The Davis and Clark decisions involve issues that arise 
out of subchapter C, dealing with corporations, in which one might 
expect to find unusually challenging concepts.236 But the Court’s 
expertise borrowing is not limited to this traditionally complex area, 
as the Don E. Williams and Foster Lumber cases demonstrate. 
Further, a number of Justices besides the four majority authors 
identified here have relied on legislative history for expertise-
 
 230. Id. at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 231. Id. at 42–43. 
 232. Id. at 42–44. 
 233. Id. at 42 & n.9. 
 234. Id. at 43 (paraphrasing H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 27 (1954); H.R. REP. NO. 76-855, at 9 
(1939)). 
 235. See id. at 43–46. Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent for himself and three colleagues, 
relied on different portions of the legislative history to support his view that Congress since 1939 
had steadily expanded the periods for loss carryover to maximize taxpayers’ ability to absorb 
their losses against income. See id. at 56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 236. See Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory 
Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 90 (1977). 
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borrowing purposes.237 One Justice who has not done so, however, is 
Justice Scalia, as we now explain. 
4. What Justice Scalia Missed.  Since joining the Court, Justice 
Scalia has regularly criticized his colleagues for relying on legislative 
history in their majority opinions.238 In a series of concurrences and 
dissents, Scalia has contended that legislative history is very likely to 
be generated for strategic or insincere reasons,239 that it is drafted or 
understood by at best small subgroups of members,240 and that for 
these and other systemic reasons it is fundamentally unreliable.241 
Justice Scalia has adopted this implacable stance in tax law cases 
as well. Although he occasionally joins majority opinions that invoke 
tax legislative history,242 he more often disparages such reliance even 
when he agrees with the Court’s holding. He has criticized majority 
use of legislative history in numerous separate concurrences243 and 
 
 237. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 479–85 (1990) (O’Connor, J., majority 
opinion); Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 370, 378, 393–94, 399 (1983) (O’Connor, J., 
majority opinion); United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 26–28 (1982) (Brennan, J., 
majority opinion); Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 83–84, 90–93 (1977) (Brennan, J., majority 
opinion); Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 255–57 (1981) (Powell, J., majority 
opinion); United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 448 n.8, 453 n.14 (1973) (Powell, J., majority 
opinion); O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 84–86 (1996) (Breyer, J., majority opinion). In 
addition, Justice Blackmun—the Court’s principal authority on federal tax law—often invoked 
legislative history to borrow expertise. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 315–16 (1983) 
(Blackmun, J., majority opinion); Cent. Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 673, 680–82, 
689–91 (1974) (Blackmun, J., majority opinion); see also infra Part III.C (analyzing Blackmun’s 
role in tax cases). 
 238. For a detailed summary of Scalia’s record on this score, see Brudney & Ditslear, supra 
note 52, at 161–62. The article cites to twenty separate opinions from 1987 to 2006. Id. 
 239. See, e.g., Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279–80 
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 
489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 637–38 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 240. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 267 (2004) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1989) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 
527–28 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 241. See, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1990–91 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment); H. J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 252 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 642–43 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 242. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 479–85 (1990); United States v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 493 U.S. 132, 139–42 (1989); Colonial Am. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Comm’r, 491 U.S. 244, 259 (1989). 
 243. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment); United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 521 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 67–70 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
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also has refused to join the legislative history portions of majority 
decisions.244 One of Scalia’s earliest and most-cited critiques of 
legislative history involves an excerpt from the floor debate 
accompanying a tax statute, an excerpt reproduced at some length by 
then-Judge Scalia of the D.C. Circuit. 
In Hirschey v. FERC,245 Judge Scalia, in a concurring opinion, 
complained that deference to committee reports was “converting a 
system of judicial construction into a system of committee-staff 
prescription.”246 The concurrence included a footnote that reproduced 
extended portions of a 1982 floor exchange between Senator 
Armstrong, a first-term Republican Senator, and Senator Dole, who 
was then chairman of the Finance Committee.247 The excerpts, which 
Scalia described as an “illuminating exchange,” featured Armstrong 
expressing concern that the committee report was not written or 
voted on by senators and may not have been read by them in its 
entirety, and suggesting that courts, agencies, and practicing attorneys 
should look for congressional intent in the words of the statute and 
not in such committee reports.248 It is worth noting, in passing, that 
many more members of Congress since the 1980s have urged that 
courts should pay attention to legislative history as a general matter.249 
 
the judgment); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 372–73 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 244. See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 85–86 (2001); United States v. 
Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 214–15 (1996); Comm’r v. Clark, 489 
U.S. 726, 728 (1989). 
 245. Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 246. Id. at 8 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 247. Id. at 7 n.1. Senator Armstrong (R-Colo.) was a member of the Senate from 1979 to 
1991, and a very junior Republican on the Finance Committee from 1981 to 1991. See 1 
GARRISON NELSON, COMMITTEES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 1947–1992, at 139–44 (1993). Senator 
Dole, elected in 1968, was a member of the Senate Finance Committee for twenty-four years 
(from 1973 to 1996). See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 1774–
1996, at 951 (Joel D. Treese ed., 1997); 1 NELSON, supra, at 139–44. He served as chairman from 
1981 to 1984, as ranking minority member from 1979 to 1980, and as second-ranking Republican 
member from 1985 to 1986; he also served as Senate Majority Leader (from 1985 to 1986 and 
from 1995 to 1996) and Senate Minority Leader (from 1987 to 1994). See BIOGRAPHICAL 
DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 1774–1996, supra, at 951; 1 NELSON, supra, at 139–
44. 
 248. See Hirschey, 777 F.2d at 7 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 249. See, e.g., Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 170–74 (1994) 
(statement of Sen. Charles F. Grassley, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); Nomination of 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 223–25 (1993) (statement of Sen. 
William S. Cohen, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 325–26 (statement of Sen. Dennis 
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Scalia later reproduced exactly the same excerpts—taken from 
his concurrence in Hirschey—in his well-known book on how federal 
courts should interpret the Constitution and laws.250 The Armstrong-
Dole colloquy is rather long and it is understandable that Scalia 
would have edited it down for his own purposes.251 What interests us, 
though is one particular explanation from Senator Dole that Scalia 
omitted. We reproduce the omitted portion in italics, along with the 
immediate context for the omission. 
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, will the Senator tell me whether or 
not he wrote the committee report? 
Mr. DOLE. Did I write the committee report? 
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes. 
Mr. DOLE. No; the Senator from Kansas did not write the committee 
report. 
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did any Senator write the committee report? 
Mr. DOLE. I have to check. 
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Does the Senator know of any Senator who wrote 
the Committee report? 
Mr. DOLE. I might be able to identify one, but I would have to 
search. I was here all during the time it was written, I might say, and 
worked carefully with the staff as they worked. As I recall, during the 
July 4 recess week there were about five different working groups of 
staff from both parties, the joint committee, and the Treasury working 
on different provisions.252  
 
DeConcini, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of 
Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 43, 45–48 (1988); Abner J. Mikva, A 
Reply to Judge Starr’s Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 385–86; Joan Biskupic, Scalia Takes a 
Narrow View in Seeking Congress’ Will, 48 CONG. Q. 913, 917 (1990) (relating Senator Specter’s 
view). Members of both parties have continued to participate in negotiating and relying on 
legislative history, further suggesting that complaints such as Senator Armstrong’s are isolated 
voices. 
 250. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 32–34. 
 251. Judge Scalia’s concurrence in Hirschey does include additional excerpts from the Dole-
Armstrong colloquy apart from the excerpt reproduced in text. See Hirschey, 777 F.2d at 7 n.1 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 252. 128 CONG. REC. 16,918 (1982) (emphasis added). There are other omissions from the 
colloquy excerpts that Judge Scalia reproduced in the Hirschey footnote and his book. These 
omissions suggest that Senator Armstrong was concerned that committee reports not be treated 
by courts or agencies “as if they were something better than statutes” and that such an approach 
would be especially dangerous in the area of tax law. Id. at 16,919 (statement of Sen. 
Armstrong). Senator Dole did not argue that legislative history is superior to text, but he did 
state that he “certainly hope[d]” the IRS and the courts would “take guidance as to the 
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For Scalia, focused on what he regards as the systemic flaws of 
legislative history, the particular aspects of tax legislative history were 
not relevant. But for Senator Dole, who spent over a decade as one of 
the key architects of federal tax legislation, the legislative history 
drafting process was of considerable relevance. Dole was apparently 
attempting to educate his freshman colleague about how this 
legislative history was produced—in deliberative bipartisan fashion, 
with interbranch cooperation and a prominent role for the Joint 
Committee on Taxation. 
As we described,253 this approach to the production of committee 
reports has been an essential feature of the tax law-writing enterprise 
for at least fifty years. Senator Dole, like other central players in the 
tax legislation process, fully anticipated that the expert elaborations 
contained in these reports would furnish valuable insights for courts 
and agencies as to what Congress meant to accomplish when enacting 
new tax code provisions.254 Most Supreme Court Justices serving since 
1970 seem to have endorsed Dole’s position, even if subconsciously, 
by relying on committee reports to borrow expertise when construing 
the technical and complex concepts enacted into the tax code. By 
insisting that legislative history be deemed inadmissible on an across-
the-board basis, Justice Scalia has overlooked or disregarded the 
special role played by tax legislative history in the production of tax 
statutes. 
B. The Canons of Construction 
Our findings regarding subject matter variations in the way the 
Court uses the canons are somewhat less dramatic than our results 
with respect to legislative history. Initially, the Court invokes the two 
 
intention of Congress from the committee report which accompanies this bill.” Id. at 16,918 
(statement of Sen. Dole); see also infra note 254 (reproducing this exchange). 
 253. See supra text accompanying notes 55–58, 169–78. 
 254. In another part of the exchange with Armstrong, also omitted from the footnote in 
Hirschey, Senator Dole makes explicit his intent in this regard: 
Mr. ARMSTRONG. My question, which may take him by surprise, is this: Is it the 
intention of the chairman that the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Court and 
other courts take guidance as to the intention of Congress from the committee report 
which accompanies this bill? 
Mr. DOLE. I would certainly hope so, plus not only the committee report but 
hopefully in the debate on certain compliance provisions that we will probably have 
lengthy discussions on the next few days. 
128 CONG. REC. 16,918. 
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types of canons in a smaller number of majority opinions.255 Further, 
regarding the categories we identified in Tables 6 and 7, the Justices 
tend to rely on the same types of canons in both tax and workplace 
decisions. For language canons, the Court in both subject matter 
areas invokes structural integrity presumptions like the whole act rule 
more often than linguistic presumptions about the meaning 
attributable to particular words.256 Similarly for substantive canons, 
the Justices rely more often on policy norms derived from generally 
applicable legal principles (like avoiding constitutional questions or 
repeals by implication) than on policy norms tailored to the particular 
subject matter of tax or workplace law.257 
Still, we identified certain differences in canons usage that 
warrant further examination. Table 7 establishes that the Justices rely 
on tax-based substantive canons almost half the time they use 
substantive canons—this is far more often than the Court invokes 
substantive canons that are tailored to workplace law. We posit that 
this is a form of subsidiary expertise borrowing by the Justices in the 
tax law area. Table 6 indicates that the Court relies on structural 
integrity language canons more heavily in tax than in workplace law. 
We suggest that this reflects the Court’s understanding of tax statutes 
as part of a single unified code. To illustrate our findings, we discuss 
particular tax opinions in which the Court exhibits these two 
canonical proclivities. 
1. Borrowing Expertise from Tax-Based Substantive Canons.  In 
United States v. Wells Fargo Bank,258 the Court held that 
 
 255. For both tax and workplace law decisions over the thirty-nine year period, the Court 
relied on language canons about half as often as it invoked legislative history and relied on 
substantive canons less than one-third as often as it used legislative record materials. Compare 
Table 4: Mean Percent Reliance on Legislative History Sources When Legislative History is 
Present, 1969–2008 (finding that the Court used legislative history in 88 tax decisions and 247 
workplace decisions), with Table 6: Mean Percent Reliance on Language Canon Subsets When 
Language Canons Are Present, 1969–2008 (finding that the Court relied on language canons in 
47 tax cases and 123 workplace cases), and Table 7: Mean Percent Reliance on Substantive 
Canon Subsets When Substantive Canons Are Present, 1969–2008 (finding that the Court 
invoked substantive canons in 24 tax decisions and 73 workplace decisions). 
 256. For a showing of 91 percent reliance on structural integrity language canons in tax law 
and 76 percent reliance in workplace law, see supra Table 6: Mean Percent Reliance on 
Language Canon Subsets When Language Canons Are Present, 1969–2008. 
 257. For a showing of 93 percent reliance on generally applicable substantive canons in tax 
law and 67 percent reliance in tax law, see supra Table 7: Mean Percent Reliance on Substantive 
Canon Subsets When Substantive Canons Are Present, 1969–2008. 
 258. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351 (1988). 
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congressionally authorized “Project Notes,” issued by state and local 
housing authorities to stimulate local financing of housing projects, 
were not statutorily exempt from federal estate taxation.259 Justice 
Brennan, writing for the majority, relied heavily on the substantive 
canon that “exemptions from taxation are not to be implied; they 
must be unambiguously proved.”260 This canon provided the 
framework for the Court’s opinion and is the key justification driving 
the majority analysis. Referring to the estate executors’ various 
arguments, Justice Brennan concluded that 
the factors appellees rely upon, whether considered alone or in 
combination, are insufficient to demonstrate that Congress intended 
to exempt Project Notes from estate taxation in contravention of the 
understood meaning of §5(e), a demonstration which must be 
unambiguous under the principle disfavoring implied tax 
exemptions.261 
More recently, in Commissioner v. Banks,262 the Court held that 
the portion of taxpayers’ monetary settlement paid directly to their 
attorneys under a contingent fee agreement constituted taxpayers’ 
gross income under the Internal Revenue Code.263 Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the majority, relied heavily on the substantive canon that 
“gains should be taxed to those who earned them.”264 Kennedy 
referred to this canon as “a maxim we have called the first principle 
of income taxation,”265 and as the rationale for the established 
doctrine of anticipatory assignment of income.266 The Court 
considered taxpayer arguments that this maxim was limited to 
preventing taxpayer fraud, but concluded that the maxim applied 
more broadly and encompassed contingent fee agreements.267 
Finally, United States v. Arthur Young & Co.268 involves a tax-
specific substantive canon covering IRS enforcement powers. The 
 
 259. Id. at 354–59. 
 260. Id. at 354. 
 261. Id. at 356 (emphasis added); see also id. at 359 (“The understood meaning of § 5(e) and 
the presumption against implied tax exemptions are too powerful to be overcome by the indicia 
of congressional intent put forward by appellees.”). 
 262. Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005). 
 263. Id. at 433–35. 
 264. Id. at 433–34 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 265. Id. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 266. Id. at 433–34. 
 267. Id. at 434–35. 
 268. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984). 
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Court held that the work papers of an independent certified public 
accountant were not protected from disclosure in response to an IRS 
summons.269 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, relied 
primarily on the canon that “restrictions upon the IRS summons 
power should be avoided absent unambiguous directions from 
Congress,”270 and he found no unambiguous evidence in this 
instance.271 
In each of these decisions, the majority regarded a tax-specific 
substantive canon as integral to its reasoning. All three cases featured 
unanimous opinions and none involved majority use of legislative 
history. Instead, the majority invoked a canon favoring broad tax 
coverage or broad IRS authority and relied on that judicial policy 
norm to frame the Court’s analysis. The Court borrows from tax-
based canons to help justify its results in a number of other cases, 
often in majority opinions that command broad support and omit 
reliance on legislative history.272 By contrast, the Court virtually never 
invokes a workplace-specific substantive canon to help support its 
holding.273 
The Court’s substantially greater reliance on subject-specific 
 
 269. See id. at 815–21. 
 270. Id. at 816. 
 271. See id. at 817–21. 
 272. See Knight v. Comm’r, 128 S. Ct. 782, 790 (2008) (9–0 decision) (invoking the canon 
that “an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace” and the taxpayer bears the 
burden of demonstrating eligibility (quoting INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 
(1992))); Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 401 (1984) (8–1 decision) (invoking the canon that 
a clear statement from Congress is needed for an exception favoring the taxpayer); United 
States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 711 (1980) (6–3 decision) (invoking the clear statement rule for an 
exemption to an IRS summons); see also Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 95 
(2001) (7–2 decision) (invoking the canon that tax exemptions must be clearly expressed; five 
members of Court also rely on legislative history); United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., 493 U.S. 132, 145 (1989) (9–0 decision) (invoking the canon that “tax provisions . . . 
incorporate domestic tax concepts absent a clear congressional exemption that foreign concepts 
control” and relying on legislative history). The large number of tax-specific substantive canons 
may be related to the presence of specialized tax courts that are perhaps more inclined to 
generate these norms based on their expert understanding of federal tax policies. We hope a tax 
law scholar will explore the origins and development of tax canons as a separate project. 
 273. Of the five instances in which the Court relied on a subject specific canon to help justify 
a workplace law result, four instances actually involve subjects other than workplace law. See 
Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. 2105, 2116 (2006) (bankruptcy 
law); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Am. Train Dispatchers’ Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991) (antitrust); 
Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1988) (commercial law); Windward Shipping (London), 
Ltd. v. Am. Radio Ass’n, 415 U.S. 104, 109–10, 112–13 (1974) (international maritime trade). 
The fifth case invoked the presumption favoring labor arbitration. Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local 
358, Bakery & Confectionary Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 254–55 (1977). 
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canons in tax cases is consistent with our finding of reliance on 
legislative history for expertise borrowing. In a field in which many 
Justices lack confidence in their mastery of the technical and 
conceptual intricacies, and may also have minimal interest in pursuing 
such mastery, relying on particularized policy norms is 
understandable. The same concerns that led Justice Douglas to 
complain about the Court’s lack of tax expertise will encourage the 
Justices—even if subconsciously—to reach for tax-based policy 
presumptions that constitute a kind of derivative expertise.274 In this 
regard, it is notable that Justice Blackmun—the Justice most 
knowledgeable about tax law during this period—almost never 
invoked these policy norms. Blackmun’s preference for reliance on 
text, history, purpose, and precedent presumably reflects greater self-
assurance regarding his own situational judgment in this subject area. 
2. Using Structural Language Canons to Construe a Self-
Contained Tax Code.  More than nine times out of ten in which the 
Court invokes language canons in its tax decisions, those canons 
consist of the whole act rule or similar presumptions implicating the 
larger cohesion or structural integrity of the text.275 Sometimes, this 
reliance involves applying the whole act rule or the presumption 
against surplusage to a single section of the Internal Revenue Code276 
or to closely adjacent related sections.277 Very often however, the 
Court invokes what one might refer to as a whole code rule. 
The Court in these whole code instances reasons that when 
Congress expresses or describes a tax law concept in one part of the 
Internal Revenue Code, that expression or description should be 
deemed probative regarding Congress’s treatment of the concept in a 
 
 274. The most plausible justification for such subject-specific norms is a judicial belief that 
Congress intends its tax legislation to be interpreted in this manner. Granting arguendo that 
Congress generally wants tax exemptions to be narrowly construed and gains to be assigned to 
those who earn them, reliance on these presumptions allows the Justices to minimize in-depth 
or de novo inquiry into what Congress meant to accomplish through a particular exemption or 
income provision. For this reason, we refer to the Court’s reliance on substantive tax canons as a 
subsidiary or derivative form of expertise borrowing. 
 275. See supra Table 6: Mean Percent Reliance on Language Canon Subsets when Language 
Canons Are Present, 1969–2008 (finding that the court involved structural cohesion or integrity 
canons in forty-three of forty-seven language canon decisions). 
 276. See e.g., Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 787–89 (interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 67(e)); Badaracco, 464 
U.S. at 395–97 (interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 6501). 
 277. See, e.g., Baral v. United States, 528 U.S. 431, 437 (2000) (contrasting 26 U.S.C. §§ 6511 
and 6513); Comm’r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1996) (contrasting 26 U.S.C. §§ 6511(a) and 
6512). 
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separate part of the code. One code provision may shed light on the 
meaning of another either because several sections should be read as 
embodying a consistent approach278 or because differences between 
two or more sections indicate that Congress intended the sections to 
have distinct consequences.279 The Justices also have extended the 
code’s self-contained status in order to harmonize provisions and 
sections enacted years or decades apart.280 
The Court’s whole code approach rests on an implicit assumption 
that Congress is a collection of relatively omniscient drafters who 
generate coherent and integrated provisions over many decades of 
legislating.281 That assumption has been criticized by legal scholars for 
projecting an unrealistic level of congressional foresight and for 
ignoring the purposive framework in which Congress drafts each 
statute.282 The omniscient drafter assumption does appear suspect 
when contemplating the possibility of consistent use or expression 
across several separate statutes or even across several distinct 
enactments within a single regulatory regime. 
One might argue, however, that concerns about disregard for 
historical context and intent resonate less when it comes to the largely 
unified and self-referential regulatory scheme embodied in the 
internal revenue laws. For this discrete portion of the U.S. Code, 
which is amended in some fashion almost annually and substantially 
updated at regular intervals, perhaps congressional drafters are better 
able to anticipate and avoid semantic residues or repetitions. The 
 
 278. See, e.g., Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 56–57 (1999) (“The absence of any 
recognition of disclaimers in [26 U.S.C.] §§ 6321, 6322, 6331(a) and 6334(a) and (c) . . . contrasts 
with § 2518 of the Code . . . .”); United States v. Hill, 506 U.S. 546, 555–56 & n.7 (1993) 
(attributing a consistent meaning to the phrase “improvements and betterments” in 26 U.S.C. § 
263 and § 1016 regulations, as distinct from “improvements” in 26 U.S.C. § 611). 
 279. See, e.g., United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 
222–23 (1996) (distinguishing 26 U.S.C. §§ 4971, 4401, 7806 and 507); United States v. Dalm, 494 
U.S. 596, 601–02 (1990) (using § 7422(a) and § 6511(a) to narrow the breadth of § 1346(a)(1)); 
United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 695–98 (1983) (comparing § 7403 with § 6331); Laing v. 
United States, 423 U.S. 161, 176–77 (1976) (recognizing that, unlike § 6861 et seq., exceptions to 
§ 6871(b) are explicit). 
 280. See, e.g., Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 13–16 (2004) (examining provisions of and 
amendments to ERISA as a whole); United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co., 430 U.S. 725, 745–
46 (1977) (harmonizing the Revenue Act of 1921 with § 820, added in 1959). 
 281. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 150–53; William D. Popkin, An “Internal” Critique of 
Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1148 (1992). 
 282. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 2, at 279–82, 280; William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress 
Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 176–77, 230–45 (2000); Popkin, supra 
note 281, at 1148–52; Ross, supra note 2, at 572. 
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Court’s tendency to assume thoroughness and cohesion in tax 
statutory language may in turn be less naive or aspirational given the 
bipartisan, interbranch, and professionalized drafting process that has 
long characterized the tax area. Once again, the Justices—however 
subconsciously—seem to be expressing their respect for this 
distinctive lawmaking process. 
We are not contending that increased reliance on a whole code 
approach should be accompanied by diminished attention to 
legislative intent or purpose. Numerous tax scholars have counseled 
against that interpretive strategy.283 Moreover, for most of our thirty-
nine year period, the Court’s greater reliance on structural language 
canons (relative to workplace law decisions) was accompanied by a 
greater reliance on legislative history as well. This raises the 
possibility that the Justices may have found the two resources to be 
mutually reinforcing given the special features of tax legislation. At 
the same time, the precipitous decline in the use of legislative history 
in tax cases since 1998 may well be related to the Court’s loss of 
expertise and interest in this area, as we discuss. 
C. Justice Blackmun 
We noted in Part II.D the unusual degree to which Justice 
Blackmun anchored the Court’s treatment of tax law during his 
twenty-four terms.284 Although all Justices bring distinctive 
professional backgrounds and experiences to the Court, Blackmun’s 
role as a tax law expert—one who practiced in the area for over two 
decades and also wrote articles and taught courses on the subject285—
may help account for his exceptional role in this specialized field. 
Blackmun’s contributions to the volume of federal tax opinions have 
no parallel in the Court’s workplace law docket. He authored twice as 
many majorities as any other Justice, he wrote more dissents than his 
colleagues (especially remarkable given his high number of majority 
 
 283. See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 55, at 829–31, 831; Moran & Schneider, supra note 55, 
at 892; Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue 
Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623, 630 (1986). 
 284. See supra text accompanying notes 129–34. 
 285. See supra note 128 (referencing several articles and speeches by Justice Blackmun); 
HARRY A. BLACKMUN AS INTERVIEWED BY HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSCRIPT: THE 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN ORAL HISTORY PROJECT 97 (1997), available at http://lcweb2. 
loc.gov/diglib/blackmun-public/series.html?ID=D09 (discussing Blackmun teaching a tax law 
course at St. Paul College of Law, which has become William Mitchell College of Law, in 1930s 
and 1940s). 
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opinions), and, for every tax law per curiam decision during his 
tenure, he either authored the opinion or wrote a dissent.286 
Justice Blackmun also anchored the Court’s approach to tax law 
from a qualitative standpoint. Assuming that one classifies the 
Court’s decisions as either progovernment or protaxpayer, 
Blackmun’s majorities are slightly more progovernment than the 
Court’s as a whole, both for the Burger period and during the 
Rehnquist/Roberts years.287 As Table 10 indicates, Blackmun’s 76 
percent progovernment majority opinions place him roughly in the 
middle compared to other Justices who authored five or more tax 
majorities.288 In this regard, it is notable that Justice Blackmun’s 76 
percent progovernment figure makes his Court opinions less 
supportive of the government’s legal position than the opinions of 
both some Justices who are routinely viewed as liberal (Marshall, 
Brennan) and some others who are generally regarded as 
conservative (Burger, Rehnquist). At the same time, Blackmun’s 
majorities are more progovernment than still other Justices who are 
traditionally thought of as liberal (Souter, Ginsburg) and conservative 
(Powell, Thomas).289 
 
 286. See supra Table 8: Percentage of Majority Opinions Authored by the Four Most 
Prolific Justices in Tax and Workplace Law during Their Tenure on the Court and 
accompanying text. 
 287. The Court’s eighty-six tax decisions in the Burger period favored the government 73.3 
percent of the time and the taxpayer 23.3 percent of the time, whereas Blackmun’s twenty-four 
majorities were 79.2 percent progovernment and 16.7 percent protaxpayer. During the 
Rehnquist/Robert years, the Court’s seventy-two tax decisions were 68.1 percent 
progovernment and 29.2 percent protaxpayer, whereas Blackmun’s ten majorities in those years 
were 70 percent progovernment and 30 percent protaxpayer. Some of these percentages do not 
add up to 100 because five Court decisions (one authored by Blackmun) are coded as a mixed 
result. 
 288. The six Justices with higher progovernment ratios than Blackmun authored a total of 
fifty-two majority opinions during our thirty-nine-year period. The eight Justices with lower 
progovernment ratios authored fifty-seven majority opinions in this period. 
 289. We find the distinction between progovernment and protaxpayer outcomes easier to 
rely on than the liberal-conservative distinction we used in our prior research involving 
workplace law. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18, at 27 & n.105 (explaining why Congress’s 
essentially unidirectional legislative goals in the workplace law area—augmenting employee 
protections to improve the conditions of employment—make it relatively easy to code outcomes 
on a liberal (proemployee) versus conservative (proemployer) scale). Justice Blackmun’s cohort 
of tax majorities exemplifies that progovernment decisions may plausibly be deemed liberal if 
corporations or wealthy individuals are forced to pay taxes, see, e.g., INDOPCO, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 90 (1992); Portland Golf Club v. Comm’r, 497 U.S. 154, 171 (1990); Nat’l 
Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 488–89 (1979); United States v. Chi., 
Burlington & Quincy R.R., 412 U.S. 401, 415–16 (1973), yet conservative if law-enforcement 
powers are applied to limit procedural or due process–type protections, see, e.g., United States 
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Table 10: Percent of Progovernment and Protaxpayer Majorities By 
Justices Authoring at Least Five Tax Majorities* 
Justice Progovernment Protaxpayer 
Burger (8) 100  0 
Rehnquist (5) 100  0 
Marshall (18)  83 11 
Brennan (11)  82 18 
Breyer (5)  80 20 
Kennedy (5)  80 20 
Blackmun (34)  76 21 
Powell (10)  70 30 
O’Connor (6)  67 17 
Souter (9)  56 44 
Thomas (6)  50 50 
Stevens (7)  43 57 
White (8)  38 50 
Ginsburg (6)  33 67 
Douglas (5)  20 80 
*Number of majorities for each Justice in parentheses. Percentages do not 
add up to 100 in all instances due to mixed-result majorities. 
Blackmun’s location at the center of this continuum comports 
with the view that his practical reasoning approach to tax law 
commanded respect for being neither ideological nor result oriented. 
Tax professors have observed that law school casebooks typically 
focus on Blackmun opinions far more than decisions authored by his 
contemporaries.290 During his time on the Court, Blackmun received 
correspondence from prominent tax scholars regarding his majority 
opinions that suggest an underlying esteem for the way he addressed 
 
v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 35 (1994); United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 556–57 (1989); Sorenson 
v. Sec’y of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 865 (1986); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 536 
(1971). Likewise, protaxpayer results may sensibly be labeled liberal if they vindicate the rights 
of individual or small business taxpayers against an encroaching IRS, see, e.g., Comm’r v. 
Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35–36 (1987); Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 33 
(1978), but conservative if they allow wealthy individuals or “special interest” corporations to 
prevail on a claimed deduction or exemption, see, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United 
States, 507 U.S. 546, 570 (1993); Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583–84 (1978). 
 290. Robert A. Green, Justice Blackmun’s Federal Tax Jurisprudence, 26 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 109, 110 (1998); Stephen B. Cohen, Thurgood Marshall: Tax Lawyer, 80 GEO. L.J. 2011, 
2011 (1992). One leading tax law casebook reproduces eleven principal Supreme Court cases 
from 1970–94, six authored by Blackmun and no more than two by any other Justice. See ALAN 
GUNN & LARRY D. WARD, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION xv–xxv (6th ed. 2006); see also 
RICHARD SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION xiii–xxvi (2d 
ed. 2007) (reproducing nine principal Supreme Court cases from 1970–94, five of which were 
authored by Blackmun). 
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the issues.291 Since Blackmun retired, scholars have noted his 
insistence on approaching the interpretation of tax statutes the same 
way he approached other laws—by relying on legislative history and 
the underlying purposes or equities of the Internal Revenue Code 
rather than simply invoking the plain meaning of text so as to 
minimize doing harm or committing error in a complex and technical 
field.292 
We wondered whether correspondence among the Justices on 
individual tax decisions might reflect Justice Blackmun’s role as the 
dominant figure in construing federal tax statutes. In an effort to 
explore that question, one of us reviewed this correspondence for the 
117 federal tax law cases decided by the Court during Justice 
Blackmun’s tenure.293 In about one-fourth of the cases, there are 
exchanges between Blackmun and other Justices that in the aggregate 
support the distinctive role he played in tax cases.294 A record of 
correspondence alone is hardly conclusive, but it does tend to confirm 
different aspects of Blackmun’s impact. 
 
 291. See, e.g., Letter from Bernard Wolfman to Harry Blackmun (June 14, 1994) (on file 
with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 640) (praising Blackmun’s opinion in United 
States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994), as “particularly cogent”); Letter from Erwin Griswold to 
Harry Blackmun (Dec. 20, 1991) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 95) 
(discussing Freytag v. United States, 501 U.S. 868 (1991)); Letter from Bernard Wolfman to 
Harry Blackmun (May 9, 1983) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 376) 
(discussing Commissioner v. Tufts, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983)); Letter from Erwin Griswold to Harry 
Blackmun (Mar. 15, 1977) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 245) 
(discussing Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977)). This is not to suggest 
that Blackmun’s tax law jurisprudence was immune to criticism by those same scholars. See, e.g., 
Bernard Wolfman, The Supreme Court in the Lyon’s Den: A Failure of Judicial Process, 66 
CORNELL L. REV. 1075 passim (1981) (critical of Blackmun’s holding and reasoning in Frank 
Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978)); Letter from Erwin Griswold to Harry Blackmun 
(May 22, 1974) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 180) (criticizing 
Blackmun’s dissenting opinion in Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974)). 
 292. See Green, supra note 290, at 130, 136–38 (discussing Blackmun’s “practical reasoning 
approach to statutory interpretation”); see also Karen Nelson Moore, Justice Blackmun’s 
Contributions on the Court: The Commercial Speech and State Taxation Examples, 8 HAMLINE 
L. REV. 29, 43–49 (1985) (discussing Blackmun’s leadership role in shaping the Court’s approach 
to state tax cases involving interstate or foreign commerce concerns). 
 293. Professor Brudney visited the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress on 
August 19–20 and September 11–12, 2008; he examined memos to Justice Blackmun from his 
law clerks and conference notes in the Justice’s handwriting as well as correspondence between 
the Justices during the opinion-writing process. Copies of all documents cited to the Blackmun 
Papers are on file with the Duke Law Journal. 
 294. For twenty-eight of the cases, we found exchanges of some substance involving 
Blackmun. 
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In Blackmun’s initial years on the Court, notes from other 
Justices praising the quality of a draft tax opinion or stating that his 
opinion led them to change their votes may reflect collegial courtesy 
or flattery directed at a newcomer.295 Moreover, one Justice often 
appeared relieved to have a colleague so willing to wield a laboring 
oar, confiding with some humor his own minimal interest in tax law.296 
But there also are a large number of decisions in which Blackmun’s 
genuine influence is on display. 
In one early case, Blackmun’s draft dissent from a denial of the 
writ of certiorari was quickly joined by three colleagues.297 The Court 
agreed to grant cert, and Blackmun ultimately wrote the majority 
opinion, converting an additional dissenting vote from conference.298 
In a number of other instances, Blackmun’s majority opinion led 
dissenting colleagues to switch their votes and join him.299 There also 
 
 295. See, e.g., Letters from Potter Stewart to William Douglas and Harry Blackmun (Mar. 
17, 1971) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 125) (joining Blackmun’s 
dissent in United States v. Randall, 401 U.S. 513 (1971)); Letter from Hugo Black to Harry 
Blackmun (Mar. 18, 1971) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 125) (same); 
Memorandum from Warren Burger to the Conference (Mar. 22, 1971) (on file with the 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 125) (same); Letter from Lewis Powell to Harry 
Blackmun (Jan. 15, 1973) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 167) (joining 
Blackmun’s per curiam opinion in United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257 (1973)). 
 296. See, e.g., Note from William Rehnquist to Harry Blackmun (Feb. 23, 1981) (on file with 
the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 329) (conceding that he “simply cannot get a handle 
on a useful dissent” in Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156 (1981)); Letter from 
William Rehnquist to Harry Blackmun (Dec. 15, 1981) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra 
note 128, Box 350) (expressing relief that Blackmun would write a dissent in Jewett v. 
Commissioner, 452 U.S. 305 (1981)); Letter from William Rehnquist to Harry Blackmun (Nov. 
11, 1974) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 195) (joining Blackmun’s 
opinion rather than “pursuing . . . a dissent” in Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43 (1974)). 
 297. See First Draft Dissent of Justice Blackmun in United States v. Chicago, Burlington & 
Quincy R.R.J. (Oct. 17, 1972) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 166) 
(dissenting from a denial of certiorari); Letter from William Douglas to Harry Blackmun (Oct. 
17, 1972) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 166) (joining Blackmun’s 
dissent in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R.J.); Letter from Byron White to Harry Blackmun 
(Oct. 18, 1972) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 166) (same); Letter from 
Warren Burger to Harry Blackmun (Oct. 20, 1972) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra 
note 128, Box 166) (same). 
 298. See Memorandum from Randy [Bezanson, law clerk] to Justice Blackmun (Apr. 30, 
1973) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 166) (discussing Justice Stewart’s 
stated intention to dissent in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. for Justice Rehnquist as well as 
himself, and adding “I did not mention anything about Justice Rehnquist’s statement to you this 
morning.”); Letter from William Rehnquist to Harry Blackmun (May 4, 1973) (on file with the 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 166) (joining Blackmun’s majority opinion in Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy R.R.). 
 299. See, e.g., Letters from William Brennan to Harry Blackmun (May 26 and May 31, 1978) 
(on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 273) (stating he is switching his vote 
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is ample evidence of fellow Justices expressing admiration for the 
clarity and persuasiveness of Blackmun’s opinion writing in the tax 
law area.300 And on one occasion, a colleague writing separately from 
Blackmun evidently asked privately for technical feedback on his own 
draft opinion.301 
This level of respect did not prevent other Justices from offering 
substantive critiques of or suggesting modifications to Blackmun 
opinions. On a number of occasions, Justice Blackmun’s colleagues 
proposed revisions to his draft majority.302 Blackmun made the 
 
from conference and joining Blackmun’s opinion in United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 
U.S. 298 (1978)); Letters from Thurgood Marshall to Harry Blackmun (May 26 and May 31, 
1978) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 273) (same); Letter from Potter 
Stewart to Harry Blackmun (Jan. 8, 1979) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, 
Box 282) (joining Blackmun’s opinion in Thor Power Tool v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 
(1979)); Letter from Lewis Powell to Harry Blackmun (Jan. 10, 1979) (on file with the 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 282) (same); Letter from Clarence Thomas to Harry 
Blackmun (May 12, 1993) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 617) (joining 
Blackmun’s opinion in Commissioner v. Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 152 
(1993)); Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Harry Blackmun (May 7, 1986) (on file with the 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 455) (indicating a plan, later abandoned, to prepare a 
dissent in United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc., 476 U.S. 593 (1986)); cf. Letter from John 
Paul Stevens to Harry Blackmun (May 21, 1986) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 
128, Box 455) (“Unlike Thurgood I remain unpersuaded and therefore will prepare a dissenting 
opinion [in Hughes Properties] . . . .”). 
 300. See, e.g., Letters from John Paul Stevens and William Brennan to Harry Blackmun 
(Jan. 8, 1979) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 282) (complimenting and 
joining Blackmun’s opinion in Thor Power Tool); Letter from Lewis Powell to Harry Blackmun 
(Jan. 10, 1979) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 282) (“In view of the 
universal acclaim of your fine opinion . . . I cheerfully join you, despite continuing reservations 
as to the inventory issue.”); Letter from John Paul Stevens to Harry Blackmun (May 16, 1983) 
(on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 376) (“I wonder if the case would have 
been decided the same way if the taxpayers’ brief [in United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 
(1983)] had been even half as persuasive as your opinion.”); Letter from John Paul Stevens to 
Harry Blackmun (Jan. 9, 1987) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 470) 
(complimenting Blackmun’s knowledge and humor in his opinion in Commissioner v. 
Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987)); Letter from Anthony Kennedy to Harry Blackmun (Feb. 24, 
1993) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 613) (“Your opinion [in Newark 
Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546 (1993)] is very fine in all respects.”). 
 301. See Letter from Harry Blackmun to John Paul Stevens (Feb. 21, 1983) (on file with the 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 368) (discussing Stevens’s concurrence in Hillsboro 
National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983)). 
 302. See, e.g., Letters from William Brennan to Harry Blackmun (Jan. 13, 19, and 23, 1978) 
(on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 264) (discussing Blackmun’s draft 
opinion in Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21 (1978)); Letter from 
John Paul Stevens to Harry Blackmun (Feb. 10, 1978) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra 
note 128, Box 264) (same); Letter from Lewis Powell to Harry Blackmun (Feb. 14, 1978) (on file 
with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 264) (same); Letter from Lewis Powell to Harry 
Blackmun (Mar. 20, 1978) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 259) 
BRUDNEY IN FINAL2.DOC 5/5/2009  4:02:09 PM 
1306 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1231 
requested adjustments or negotiated a compromise in some 
instances303 whereas in other cases he refused to make a change.304 
Still, the overall impression that emerges from correspondence 
among the Justices is one of fairly regular substantive exchanges on 
the merits of tax draft opinions with Blackmun playing a central role 
in many if not most of the exchanges.305 
 
(suggesting edits to Blackmun’s draft opinion in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 
(1978)); Letter from Sandra Day O’Connor to Harry Blackmun (April, 25, 1983) (on file with 
the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 470) (suggesting changes to Blackmun’s opinion in 
Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983)); Letter from John Paul Stevens to Harry Blackmun 
(Apr. 14, 1983) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 470) (same); Letter from 
Sandra Day O’Connor to Harry Blackmun (May 10, 1993) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, 
supra note 128, Box 617) (suggesting edits to Blackmun’s draft opinion in Commissioner v. 
Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 152 (1993)); Letter from Anthony Kennedy to 
Harry Blackmun (May 11, 1993) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 617) 
(same), Letter from Clarence Thomas to Harry Blackmun (May 13, 1993) (on file with the 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 617) (same). 
 303. See, e.g., Letter from Harry Blackmun to John Paul Stevens (Feb. 10, 1978) (on file 
with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 264) (accepting Stevens’s suggestion in Central 
Illinois); Letter from Harry Blackmun to Lewis Powell (Mar. 21, 1978) (on file with the 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 259) (accepting Powell’s suggestions in Frank Lyon Co.); 
Letter from Harry Blackmun to Sandra Day O’Connor (May 17, 1993) (on file with the 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 617) (omitting a section of his draft opinion in Keystone 
Consolidated Industries per O’Connor’s request). 
 304. See, e.g., Letters from Harry Blackmun to William Brennan (Jan. 16 and 20, 1978) (on 
file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 264) (declining Brennan’s suggested 
statement in Central Illinois); Letters from Harry Blackmun to Anthony Kennedy and Clarence 
Thomas (May 17, 1993) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 617) (refusing 
to accommodate Kennedy’s and Thomas’s suggested changes in Keystone Consolidated 
Industries); see also Letter from Harry Blackmun to Sandra Day O’Connor (Jan. 12, 1987) (on 
file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 470) (making some but not all of the 
changes requested in Groetzinger); Letter from Harry Blackmun to Lewis Powell (Oct. 27, 
1976) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 238) (making some but not all of 
the changes requested in a dissent to United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32 (1976)). 
 305. There are an ample number of exchanges between Justices other than Blackmun on 
draft opinions not authored by Blackmun. See, e.g., Letters Between Justices Stevens and 
Brennan (January 24, 1978) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 264) 
(discussing Brennan’s draft opinion in Fulman v. United States, 431 U.S. 928 (1977)); Letters 
Between Justices Kennedy and Souter (Jan. 7 and 11, 1993) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, 
supra note 128, Box 615) (negotiating edits in Souter’s draft opinion in United States v. Hill, 506 
U.S. 546 (1993)); Letters Between Justices O’Connor and Souter (Apr. 5 and 12, 1994) (on file 
with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 638) (suggesting edits to Souter’s draft opinion 
in United States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224 (1994)). At the same time, there are exchanges in which 
the majority author negotiates to secure Blackmun’s support even as Blackmun also drafts a 
concurring opinion. See, e.g., Letters Between William Rehnquist and Harry Blackmun (Apr. 28 
and May 11, 1983) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 381) (discussing 
O’Connor’s draft opinion and Blackmun’s draft concurrence in Regan v. Taxation With 
Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983)); Letters Between Byron White and Harry Blackmun (Nov. 
10, Dec. 1, 4, and 6, 1978) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 283) 
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Assuming arguendo that Blackmun was in fact and to an unusual 
degree a pivotal influence on tax law jurisprudence during his twenty-
four terms, what impact if any might this have had on the Court’s 
reasoning approach? There have been only thirty-two federal tax 
decisions in the fourteen terms since Blackmun’s departure. In these 
decisions, the post-Blackmun Court has relied somewhat more on 
text and language canons in these decisions,306 and the Court has 
relied significantly less on legislative history.307 
During Blackmun’s tenure, he invoked legislative history 
regularly in his majorities, and so did the Court as a whole. It seems at 
least plausible that Blackmun’s understanding of tax law and his 
attentiveness to the intricacies of legislative history often 
accompanying tax law disputes may have served as a cue, helping to 
stimulate a similar willingness by his colleagues to engage this 
resource.308 In that regard, four of the Justices who most frequently 
interacted with Blackmun on the merits of his draft opinions were 
Justices Stevens, Powell, O’Connor, and Brennan.309 These four 
Justices relied on legislative history in 77 percent of the thirty tax 
majorities they authored while serving with Blackmun.310 Encouraged 
by Blackmun’s example and leadership, they and other Justices may 
 
(withdrawing a proposed concurrence after White circulated a second draft in United California 
Bank v. United States, 439 U.S. 180 (1978)). 
 306. Reliance on text since 1994 has been 71.9 percent (23 of 32 cases) versus 65.5 percent of 
cases during Blackmun’s tenure (76 of 116 cases from the 1970–94 terms). Reliance on language 
canons since 1994 has been 40.6 percent (13 of 32 cases) versus 27.6 percent of cases in the 
Blackmun years (32 of 116 cases from the 1970–94 terms). 
 307. Reliance on legislative history since 1994 has been 34.4 percent of cases (11 of 32 of 
cases), which contrasts with 62.9 percent during the Blackmun period (73 of 116 of cases for the 
1970–94 terms). This difference is highly significant (t = .001). 
 308. Our suggestion that Blackmun’s use of tax legislative history functioned as a cue for 
many of his colleagues may help account for why, collectively, they relied on this resource 
slightly more often even than he did, see supra Table 9: Comparing Justice Blackmun’s Reliance 
on Legislative History in Tax Cases with the Reliance of Other Justices, and then continued to 
rely on it at a high level for the first several years after he retired, see supra note 143. Once the 
reinforcing “lesson” of Blackmun’s approach wore off, however, it was replaced by the more 
generic reinforcement of Justice Scalia’s hostility to legislative history. 
 309. See sources cited supra notes 300–04. 
 310. For O’Connor the figure is 100 percent (four of four cases); for Stevens the figure is 80 
percent (four of five cases); for Brennan 91 percent (ten of eleven cases); and for Powell 50 
percent (five of ten cases). O’Connor and Stevens invoked legislative history in one of the four 
majorities they authored after Blackmun’s departure. 
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have been more willing to treat tax law seriously—even if they also 
expressed on occasion some distaste for the subject.311 
The readiness of Justice Blackmun’s colleagues to rely on 
legislative history does not mean they were always as comfortable 
with this expertise-laden resource as was Blackmun himself. Some 
indication of the other Justices’ differing level of confidence may be 
seen when examining their respective approaches to invoking 
legislative history in dissents if the majority had relied on that history. 
Justice Blackmun was much more likely than his colleagues to use 
legislative history in dissent to counter legislative history reliance in a 
majority opinion.312 And his colleagues were especially reluctant to 
rely on this history when Blackmun authored the majority.313 
Nonetheless, it remains true that other Justices used legislative 
history more often than not in their majority opinions until Blackmun 
departed from the Court. 
Further, since Blackmun’s retirement, tax cases have comprised a 
smaller share of the Court’s decisions. During Blackmun’s twenty-
four years of service, federal income tax cases comprised 3.53 percent 
of the Court’s docket—including 4.04 percent in the first eight terms 
of the Rehnquist Court.314 Since 1994, that proportion has fallen to 
 
 311. For instances of the occasional expression of distaste for tax law, see, for example, 
Letter from John Paul Stevens to Harry Blackmun (Jan. 8, 1979) (on file with the Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 128, Box 282) (“Dear Harry, As you know, I am no fan of tax cases. But I 
must confess that if I had known that this case [Thor Power Tool v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 
(1979)] was going to result in such a fine opinion, I would have voted to grant cert.”); Letter 
from William Rehnquist to Harry Blackmun (Dec. 15, 1981) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, 
supra note 128, Box 350) (“Dear Harry: As you might have guessed, I am delighted that you are 
willing to take on the dissent in this case [Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305 (1982)].”). 
 312. In fifty nonunanimous tax law cases in which the majority relied on legislative history, 
the dissent relied on legislative history sixteen times, or 32 percent of the time. When Justice 
Blackmun wrote the dissent he used legislative history to counter majority reliance on 
legislative history 50 percent of the time (five of ten cases); when other Justices authored the 
dissent they invoked legislative history 28 percent of the time (eleven of forty cases). 
 313. Of the forty dissents authored by other Justices, thirty-one occurred during Justice 
Blackmun’s tenure and nine of them invoked legislative history. When Blackmun authored the 
majority, dissent reliance was only 17 percent (two of twelve cases). When others authored the 
majority, dissent reliance rose to 37 percent (seven of nineteen cases). 
 314. From the 1970 Term through the 1993 Term, the Court decided 116 federal tax cases 
out of 3,287 total merits decisions. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT 
COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS 87–92 tbl.2-11 (4th ed. 2007); Brudney 
& Distlear, supra note 63. During the first eight years of the Rehnquist Court, the Justices 
decided 40 tax cases out of 990 merits decisions. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra at 87–92 tbl.2-11; 
Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 63. 
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2.95 percent,315 a one-sixth decline from the overall Blackmun era 
average. Other factors may be contributing to this decline apart from 
the diminished interest and confidence of the Justices. Congress has 
enacted fewer comprehensive or conceptually innovative federal tax 
laws in recent decades; one result may be a gradual decline in 
appellate litigation about new interpretive matters.316 In addition, a 
growing IRS interest in settling disputes at a pre-judicial stage may 
lead to fewer cert-worthy cases.317 But whatever the weight 
attributable to each factor, it seems that the Court is less interested 
in—and perhaps less invested in grappling with—expertise-related 
issues of federal tax law since Blackmun’s departure. At a minimum, 
this development suggests that the judicial asset of diverse 
professional experience deserves further scholarly attention. 
CONCLUSION 
At the outset, we described how statutory interpretation debates 
have generally assumed that the virtues or vices of key interpretive 
resources are systemic in nature. Against this backdrop, our review of 
the Court’s interpretive approach in tax law reveals some intriguing 
differences from the Justices’ reasoning in the workplace law area. 
Because normative discussion and empirical research (including our 
own) have focused primarily on ideologically charged areas such as 
labor and civil rights, the reasoning patterns we have observed for tax 
 
 315. From the 1994 Term through the 2007 Term, the Court decided 32 federal tax cases out 
of 1,084 merits decisions. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, Table 
2–11, 1946–2006 Terms (4th ed. revised 2007), available at CQ Press Electronic Library, The 
Supreme Court Compendium Online Edition, http://library.cqpress.com/sccm/scc4thR_tab2-11 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2009) (subscription required) (reporting 1015 total decisions from the 1994 
term through the 2006 term); Statistics for the Supreme Court’s October Term 2007, 77 U.S.L.W. 
3063, 3072 (Aug. 5, 2008) (reporting 69 total merits opinions from argued and non-argued 
cases). 
 316. See Staudt et al., supra note 71, at 1818 n.68 (observing that Congress revised the tax 
code twenty-three times between 1913 and 1954, but that the code’s basic structure has been 
unchanged since 1954). 
 317. See, e.g., IRS Launches New Settlement Initiative for Corporate Tax Shelters, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, Aug. 7, 2008, LEXIS, 2008 TNT 153-1; IRS Announces Settlement Initiative for 
Wide Array of Transactions, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 28, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 208-13; IRS 
Announces Employer-Provided Meals Settlement Initiative, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 5, 1998, 
LEXIS, 98 TNT 150-8. See generally Gregory P. Mathews, Using Negotiation, Mediation, and 
Arbitration to Resolve IRS-Taxpayer Disputes, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 709 (2004) 
(examining the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques by the IRS); David 
Parsly, The Internal Revenue Service and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Moving from Infancy 
to Legitimacy, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 677 (2007) (detailing types of ADR programs 
implemented by the IRS). 
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law reveal an underappreciated judicial angle of vision on the 
legislative process. 
The Court in its tax law decisions relies significantly more often 
on both language canons and legislative history, for seemingly related 
reasons. The Justices’ extraordinary focus on language canons 
promoting structural integrity suggests a belief, even if implicit, that 
the federal tax code is best viewed as a single integrated whole 
notwithstanding its size and its construction over many decades. That 
belief presumably derives in part from an appreciation for the legacy 
of professional and nonpartisan legislative drafting on tax matters. 
These same qualities of objectivity, nonpartisanship, and cross-
branch cooperation also apply to the drafting of tax legislative 
history. The Court’s record of crediting standing committee reports 
reflects an understanding that these committee narratives—prepared 
by experts—assume special value in an area where the textual 
language and policy concepts are technically complex and less readily 
decipherable. The majority opinions we reviewed illustrate how the 
Court uses tax legislative history to borrow expertise, in contrast to 
the more familiar reliance on this history to help discern the existence 
or details of a congressional compromise. The Court’s interest in 
expertise borrowing is also manifested in a more derivative way with 
respect to the substantive canons. Although the Justices’ overall use 
of substantive canons is no heavier in tax law than workplace law, 
their disproportionate reliance on tax-based canons reflects a 
willingness to invoke tax policy presumptions as a way of shaping and 
simplifying their analyses. 
In our prior empirical research addressing the Court’s statutory 
workplace decisions, we demonstrated that the Justices’ use of 
legislative history to identify and describe legislative bargains was 
more principled than some critics have suggested, whereas the 
Rehnquist Court’s reliance on the canons was more instrumental and 
politicized than had previously been recognized.318 For the Court’s 
statutory tax decisions, different functional priorities seem to apply—
specifically, expertise borrowing is a central value for the Justices. 
The fact that familiar interpretive resources play distinctive roles in 
the area of tax law contributes to a subtler and richer texture for 
statutory interpretation than is often captured in scholarly debates. In 
 
 318. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 137–60 (reporting and discussing the 
legislative history results); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18, at 53–69, 77–97 (reporting and 
discussing the canons results). 
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addition, the Blackmun effect suggests that at least for a field 
perceived as tepid in terms of ideology and also judicial interest, the 
Justices may be willing to follow the interpretive example of a 
knowledgeable colleague when grappling with statutory challenges. 
Most Justices who served during the Burger or 
Rehnquist/Roberts periods seem to have participated in this relatively 
nuanced approach to statutory construction. That is not necessarily 
true, however, for Justices with a more inflexible vision of the 
interpretive enterprise. Moreover, our results also suggest that the 
Court has recently exhibited greater uniformity in its patterns of 
reasoning in tax law and workplace law cases.319 Perhaps the 
philosophical arguments favoring one-size-fits-all statutory 
interpretation are beginning to trump a pragmatic orientation that is 
more sensitive to differences among particular subject matter areas of 
federal law. We hope other scholars will pursue this question by 
examining the Court’s reasoning in potentially distinctive fields such 
as criminal or environmental law. 
Insofar as we are witnessing the advent of a more monolithic 
Court position toward interpreting statutes, this trend is likely to 
influence the behavior of other judges and practicing attorneys.320 A 
clear signal from the Justices that canons and legislative history 
should be valued or discounted with little attention to the law’s 
varying substantive contexts would effectively encourage lawyers and 
lower courts to modify their own reasoning methods and techniques. 
Before such a trend accelerates, we hope that Justices and judges with 
a more pragmatic orientation will consider whether a standardized 
approach to interpretation adequately respects the diverse and 
intricate features of the American statutory fabric. 
 
 319. See supra text accompanying Table 2: Reliance on Selected Interpretive Resources—
Burger Court Decisions and Rehnquist/Roberts Court Decisions; supra text accompanying note 
93. 
 320. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 170–71 (discussing the normative 
implications of Justice Scalia’s impact on colleagues with respect to legislative history use). 
